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Abstract 
This paper is an attempt to study the United Nations through the lens of 
organizational theory, and in particular, the theoretical framework as outlined by Allison 
and Zelikow in Essence of Decision, in order to understand the implementation patterns 
of the UN in regards to the Brahimi Report as reported and analyzed by the Henry L. 
Stimson Center.  The findings of this report conclude that the UN is capable of change as 
demonstrated by its ability to comply with certain Brahimi Report recommendations, but 
is resistant to change, due to the structure of the organization.  This does not mean, 
however, that it is fundamentally unable to do so.  Attempts at reform must be able to 
circumvent these obstacles through targeted, direct action, for the Brahimi Report 
recommendations which received the highest implementation ratings were those 
incremental organizational reforms that targeted specific aspects of peacekeeping 
operations.  Resistance to change within the UN, be it on behalf of individuals, 
departments, or Member States, is a huge obstacle to change, further compounding the 
obstacles to reform that the UN faces simply as an organization.  Future reforms must 
thus be framed in a way that specifically grasps the attention of the groups/members 
involved in the reform, making the issue as pertinent and sensitive to them as it is for the 
success of UN peace operations in general.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations was created in 1945 with the intent of providing an 
international forum by which countries around the world could work together to maintain 
international peace and security and international economic and social cooperation.  The 
name itself, United Nations, was created by Franklin D. Roosevelt and represents the idea 
of a world government working together towards common goals that benefit not only its 
member states, but all of mankind.  However, since its creation, the UN has encountered 
many difficulties that have scarred its reputation as a capable, functioning institution, 
including several failed attempts to successfully intervene in world conflicts.  In general, 
“failure” in regard to interventions means that the UN failed to encourage the developed 
world to act in a certain conflict, such as during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda; failed to 
effectively intervene or carry out the distribution of humanitarian aid, for example, during 
the Second Congo War and Somalia; or failed in an intervention to successfully protect 
designated “safe havens” for refugees, such as during the killings in Srebrenica.  These 
failures have led many to judge the UN as weak, and question whether the organization 
will be able to fulfill the primary goals for which it was originally created, the 
maintenance of international peace and security.    
The study of the United Nations’ ability to effectively intervene in international 
security conflicts is important when one remembers the legacies or consequences of 
failed peace operations, such as the Somalia intervention.  The UN intervention in 
Somalia began in 1992, and fifteen years later, the world is no closer to establishing 
 2 
peace and security in this war-torn country than ever before.  It is important to remember 
what happens when the UN fails as an intervening force—not only is the actual structure 
of the state left in questionable condition, but the future of the state as well as the lives of 
its people are left at stake.  It is absolutely necessary that the international community 
focuses on how to reform the UN in order to be able to avoid another Somalia, another 
Srebrenica, or another Rwanda, for human lives and the stability of the international 
arena depends on it.  
The question as to whether or not the United Nations will be able to fulfill the 
ideals for which it was created, therefore, is extremely pertinent in today’s increasingly 
unstable international environment. Thus, it is important to understand where the UN is 
faltering, and what exactly is happening in the situations where it has “failed,” such as the 
1992 intervention in Somalia.  Somalia is a unique example of an intervention that 
steadily progressed from a strictly humanitarian peace operation (UNOSOM I), to a hard 
military intervention under a Chapter VII mandate of the UN Charter (UNITAF) and 
(UNOSOM II), providing an important lesson on the range of success and failure that an 
international intervention can experience when attempting to undertake international 
conflict management.  One of the enduring legacies is the absolute necessity of the 
credibility of an intervening force, with Somalia highlighting exactly what happens when 
an intervention’s credibility (i.e., UNOSOM II) is lost.  One of the reasons that UNITAF 
was able to achieve its mission mandate in Somalia was due to the fact that the U.S.-led 
coalition was very capable of effectively using coercive diplomacy to deal with the 
warring factions involved—entailing that UNITAF was a credible, intervening force. 
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With the mission handoff between the two operations completed, when UNITAF pulled 
out of Somalia, the credible threat to the warring parties was out of the picture, and the 
warring clans were once again able to resume fighting.  UNITAF, therefore, was able to 
effectively use coercive diplomacy and force the parties to come to the negotiating table, 
whereas UNOSOM II was not, and therefore, lost control of the situation.   
Unfortunately, Somalia is not the only example of a “failed” UN operation that 
was not perceived as a credible, intervention force resulting in an operation that 
ultimately failed to protect the lives of civilians caught in the crossfire.  The intervention 
in Yugoslavia, which commenced with the deployment of UNPROFOR in 1992, was 
designated to facilitate the return of refugees, interpose itself between the warring 
factions, slow and reduce the level of combat so as to allow for the progression of the 
peace process, as well as defend and monitor UN protection areas.1  However, as Ziring, 
Riggs, and Plano state in The United Nations, UNPROFOR “could neither protect itself 
nor the victims of indiscriminate aggression and ethnic cleansing pogroms.”2 One of the 
most notorious failings of the humanitarian mission took place in Srebrenica, a declared 
“safe area,” in July 1995, where an estimated 8,000 Bosnian males, ranging in age from 
teenagers to the elderly, were killed. The UN was unable to prevent the massacre despite 
the fact that over 400 Dutch peacekeepers were present at the time.  The Srebrenica 
massacre was the largest mass murder in Europe since World War II and signified not 
                                                
1 Lawrence Ziring, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano, The United Nations: International Organization 
and World Politics, 4th ed. (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2005), 240. 
2 Ibid. 
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only the failure of UNPROFOR, but also the failure of NATO, who failed to follow 
through on their threats regarding the use of NATO airpower.   
Rwanda constituted a different kind of failure for the United Nations, but was a 
failure nonetheless.  In this case, the failure to intervene in Rwanda is a legacy that will 
forever scar the UN’s reputation as an effective, credible international force.  Although 
many sources argue that one of the fundamental obstacles to an intervention in Rwanda 
was the lack of credible information and actual knowledge of what was taking place, it 
seems clear now that knowing exactly what was going on during the months of April and 
May of 1994 was not the real problem – it was rather, acting upon what was known, that 
was. In other words, although reports may have varied as to the extent of the killing, one 
thing was clear to all members of the Security Council – something was happening in 
Rwanda that required immediate attention.  The problem, unfortunately, was a lack of 
political will on behalf of Security Council members to take action. As Kuperman states 
in “Rwanda in Retrospect,” “As reports of genocide reached the outside world starting in 
late April, public outcry spurred the United Nations to reauthorize a beefed-up UNAMIR 
II on May 17.  During the following month, however, the UN was unable to obtain any 
substantial contributions of troops and equipment.  As a result, on June 22 the Security 
Council authorized France to lead its own intervention, Operation Turquoise, by which 
time most Tutsi were already long dead.”3    
The most recent failure of the UN to effectively act in the face of humanitarian 
crises and genocide is the developing tragedy in Darfur. The difficulty with this situation 
                                                
3 Alan J. Kuperman, "Rwanda in Retrospect," Foreign Affairs 79, no. 1 (2000): 105. 
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is that while UN Member States seem more willing (and thus more likely) to commit 
troops for a traditional peacekeeping mission, the government of Sudan is unwilling to 
give its consent.  This leaves the UN with the option of pursuing a Chapter VII 
intervention, i.e. without the government’s consent, entailing the use of coercive force.  
However, the political commitment of the international community to pursue such an 
option has been lacking.  The responsibility of securing the region, therefore, falls back to 
the African Union mission that is currently deployed in Sudan.  Unfortunately, the 
African Union peacekeepers amount to only 7,000 troops, equipped with limited rules of 
engagement.  These troops do not constitute enough force to bring security to the 
refugees themselves, let alone to secure the entire region.  Although the UN is committed 
to the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine which was passed at the UN Summit in 2005, 
the Darfur tragedy demonstrates the difficulty of turning this doctrine into action.  
In order to answer why UN peace operations, particularly those requiring the use 
of coercive force are either not living up to expectations or are downright failing, it is 
important to understand where the UN is faltering and what exactly is happening in the 
situations where it has “failed.”   
One of the main factors contributing to the difficulties that seem to arrive with 
each security intervention lies in the foundational structure of the organization itself: the 
UN’s management of military activities and actions, as well as its military capabilities, 
are not designed to support the complex military operations that peacemaking operations 
require.  Military operations require, among other things, availability of forces, unity of 
command, as well as a clear command structure.  These three fundamental characteristics 
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of military interventions, while necessary, are obviously not sufficient for a “successful” 
military operation to occur.  However, the UN, which relies on member-states’ 
contributions, clearly cannot fulfill these three basic necessities.  For example, mustering 
the political will necessary to back UN interventions has often doomed an attempted 
peace operation from the start, with Member States refusing to contribute forces or to 
agree to the political objectives at hand.  In other cases, Member States who are willing to 
contribute troops are unable to compile meaningful force numbers equipped with the 
necessary equipment and logistical support.  In regards to unity of command, some 
member-states, particularly the United States, insist upon maintaining control over their 
troops deployed in the field (i.e. an American force commander for American troops) 
regardless of who the designated Force Commander is for the particular peace operation.  
This leads to separate command and control centers outside of the United Nations’ own 
command and control structure for peace operations.  This inefficient command 
arrangement results in a constant relaying and crossing of information, territorial turf 
battles, and inevitable confusion on the field.  
A large part of the current literature and analyses of United Nations peacekeeping 
and peacemaking operations focus on the success and/or failure of the operations largely 
in terms of the situation on the ground, i.e., what conditions foster a successful 
intervention (e.g.: timing of an intervention, adequate force levels, legitimate consent of 
the involved parties, or full accord with cease-fire agreements), and what conditions have 
traditionally led to a particular intervention’s downfall.  For example, in Michael 
Wesley’s Causalities of the New World Order, Wesley explicitly denies the possibility 
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that the UN’s string of failures since the early 1990s is a result of the “ideological 
radicalization of the body, or from corruption and waste, or from an excessive and 
inefficient bureaucracy.”4   Rather, he argues that the failings of UN missions are instead 
due to the significant structural weaknesses of operations’ missions as well as the method 
of dispatch by UN member-states.  He continues by focusing on the frequent injection of 
UN peace forces into conflict-ridden civil war zones which simply exacerbate the mission 
failings of the operation.   
In an address to the Austrian Parliament in 2000, Under-Secretary-General for 
Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno discussed the shift in nature and 
character of UN peace operations in the post-Cold War era, specifically highlighting the 
role of “spoilers” and the disastrous effect that they have had in previous peacekeeping 
operations.  She describes that in this new post-Cold War era, UN peacekeeping 
operations have been increasingly deployed into intra-state conflicts having to deal with 
the demands and threats of various warring parties.  She states that, “In some of these 
cases, we have seen the United Nations’ resolve to carry out its mandate challenged by 
some parties to the conflict, who are either holding out for more favorable terms or have 
few interests to be served by ending the hostilities. These would-be spoilers of peace 
processes present the Organization and its membership with some fundamental questions 
which go to the heart of what peacekeeping is and how it should be conducted.” Her 
specific focus on these so-called “spoilers” in this relatively short address to the Austrian 
                                                
4 Michael Wesley, Casualties of the New World Order: the causes of failure of UN missions to civil wars 
(New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 273. 
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parliament, therefore, is quite indicative of her beliefs regarding what factors were most 
influential in the publicized UN failures of the 1990s.5  
Similarly, in the Henry L. Stimson Center’s UN Peace Operations and the 
“Brahimi Report” (October 2001 revision), William J. Durch and the Panel on UN Peace 
Operations explicitly address the absolute necessity of missions being able to defend 
against potential “spoilers” of accords that end civil wars.6 The report goes even further 
to argue it is pointless to deploy an operation that can be “kicked around by local thugs.”7   
Beatrice Puligny, in Peace Operations Seen From Below, highlights the necessity 
of peace missions having adequate knowledge and understanding of the local contexts 
within which the operation is deployed.8  She argues that is the local community’s 
perception of the UN and the way in which UN officials communicate and interact with 
local communities that greatly influences an operation’s chance of success or failure in 
any given situation.  She believes, therefore, that one fundamental aspect of reform is for 
the UN Secretariat to overcome the material restraints imposed by Member States on 
peace interventions to allow for all involved members of an operation to have relevant 
tools of analysis to understand and monitor what is changing in the societies in which 
their particular peace operation has been deployed.9  
                                                
5 Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under Secretary-General Guéhenno Expresses Guarded Optimism for UN 
Peacekeeping in Austrian Parliament (UN Information Service 2000 [cited April 2007]); available from 
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2000/usg1.html. 
6 William J. Durch, "UN Peace Operations and the "Brahimi Report","  (Washington D.C.: Henry L. 
Stimson Center, 2001), 5. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Béatrice Pouligny, Peace Operations Seen From Below: UN missions and Local people (Bloomfield, CT: 
Kumarian Press, 2006), 273. 
9 Ibid. 
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Andrea Talentino, in Military Intervention after the Cold War, argues specifically 
in regards to the UN’s failed peacebuilding efforts in Somalia that the operation failed 
due to the fact that the involved militaries were, as he states, “not accustomed to pursuing 
reconciliation rather than conquest.”10  He argues that the operation’s larger objectives 
could not be accomplished due to the fact that the intervention had no real strategy.  This 
lack of strategy fundamentally inhibited the operation from succeeding, resulting in a 
peace intervention doomed by the UN’s haphazard approach.11  
The bulk of current literature, therefore, focuses on the situational ground factors 
of an intervention while failing to effectively address the issue of the structural and 
organizational problems these interventions face.  It is necessary, however, to take a step 
back in order to analyze the intervention from the organizational side of the United 
Nations peacekeeping/peacemaking operation procedures.   
In 2000, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (commonly 
referred to as the “Brahimi Report”) was released, signifying a turning point for the way 
in which peace operations were analyzed.  The report was a study undertaken by the 
Panel on United Nations Peace Operations upon request by then-Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan.   This report did not focus on the ground aspects of peace interventions, but rather 
focused entirely on the United Nations organization itself, recommending a broad array 
of specific changes to the UN in order to restructure the way in which peace operations 
and related activities are organized, planned, and executed.  The report highlighted 
                                                
10 Andrea Kathryn Talentino, Military Intervention After the Cold War: the Evolution of Theory and 
Practice (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2005), 126. 
11 Ibid. 
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specific areas in which the United Nations is failing organizationally and structurally, and 
helped to launch an institution-wide reform of the United Nations in order to improve its 
peace operation capabilities.12  
The 2003 Brahimi Report and the Future of Peace Operations was a project by 
the Stimson Center to track the recommendations of the Brahimi Report as implemented 
and followed by the United Nations in the three years following its release.  This report 
uses a grading system to assess the levels of UN compliance with the report’s 
recommendations, and provides recommendations by which the UN can continue to 
improve.   
Thus, both the Brahimi Report and The Brahimi Report and the Future of Peace 
Operations, by focusing on the organizational structure of the UN as a determining factor 
on the success and/or failure of peace operations, provide the foundational analysis 
necessary for readers to understand why the UN needs to reform its peace operation 
structures.  On a fundamental level, the two reports recognize the inherent causal 
relationship between the physical interventions on the ground with the failings of the UN 
organizationally.   This foundational analysis is necessary in order to help readers 
understand why the UN has had difficulty reforming some aspects of its intervention 
procedures which have been targeted for reform by the Brahimi Report, with the 
recommendations targeting the limitations of the UN’s management and execution of 
military capabilities in peace interventions in the hopes of saving the credibility of 
peacekeeping and peacemaking operations as a viable solution to international conflicts.   
                                                
12 William J. Durch et al., "The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations,"  (Washington, 
D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003). 
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This thesis will thus focus on the structural problems within the UN’s 
organization that inherently inhibit the UN’s ability to effectively intervene in peace 
interventions.  The approach is: first, discuss the relevant history to this analysis, i.e. the 
UN’s development of peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, elaborating on the 
particular UN peace operation in Somalia and how the bulk of the current literature that 
exists examining the failures of this mission focus primarily on the ground issues of the 
intervention; second, outline a framework of organizational theory with which to 
understand the difficulties organizations typically experience in their functional 
capacities and how that relates to the structural setup of the particular organization; third, 
examine the Brahimi Report as well as The Brahimi Report and the Future of Peace 
Operations as a tool to identify the explicit areas the UN is having difficulty complying 
with; fourth, apply organizational theory as a framework to understand why the UN is 
having trouble implementing these particular recommendations, analyzing how this 
difficulty stems from the organization’s structural set-up by focusing on the particular 
weaknesses and/or failures of international organizations as outlined in the second 
section; and finally, use the analysis of  the United Nations within the organizational 
theory context to explore what lies ahead for the organization in terms of its peace 
intervention capabilities.   
Research Design  
In the years following the release of the Brahimi Report, the question has been 
raised as to whether or not the UN will be able to adequately reform the design and 
practice of the organization’s peacemaking activities in order to take into account the 
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UN’s inherent military organizational weaknesses.  It is, undeniably, an important 
question that must be answered, for if the United Nations ever hopes to be able to reassert 
itself as a credible, capable, intervening force within the international arena, the 
organization and its member-states must be able to prove to each other, as well as 
themselves, that the organization is not only willing to comply with the recommendations 
as provided by the Brahimi Report, but is also capable of doing so.  In order to 
understand, therefore, whether or not the UN is organizationally capable of complying 
with these crucial recommendations, the reasons for which the UN has been unable to 
comply with certain recommendations thus far must be analyzed. 
Outside of the Brahimi Report and the Stimson analysis that followed three years 
later, the bulk of the current literature that critiques UN peace interventions focus on the 
ground issues of a peace operation.  It is important, however, to take a step back from this 
level of analysis in order to take a look at how the UN functions internally in regards to 
peace interventions.  It is, of course, the organization itself, its internal functions and 
organizational capabilities that translate into and affect the ground situation of an 
intervention by affecting the way an intervention is organized, structured, and 
commanded militarily.   
This approach, with the focus on the organization itself rather than on the 
situational variables on the ground once an operation has been deployed, attempts to 
approach the source of the problem – understanding the United Nations as an 
organization, not as an independent entity with capacities of its own, which consequently 
affects how the UN is studied in relation to its responsibilities.  It is with the hope that by 
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studying the organizational problems that the UN currently faces, with a particular focus 
on why the UN is having these operational and structural difficulties, the organization 
will be better able to adapt in an attempt to rectify current problems in order to redesign 
itself for a better, more capable and functioning future.   
This approach employs a small-n analysis, by first focusing solely on 
organizations in general through an organizational theory framework.  That framework is 
then applied to the United Nations in order to understand the UN within the context of the 
successes and failures of organizations in theory, and using the Somalia intervention as a 
concrete example, to point out specific instances in which the organizational failings of 
the UN negatively impacted the degree of success of the three intervention phases 
(UNOSOM I, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II). Next, I use the analysis of the United Nations 
within the organizational theory context to analyze why the UN is having difficulty 
complying with the peace intervention reforms as recommend by the Brahimi Report and 
what lies ahead for the organization in terms of its peace intervention capabilities.   
My approach will, therefore, be to conduct congruence tests in order to support 
my hypothesis that the UN’s failings in peace interventions and its inability to adapt to 
specific reforms which could, hypothetically, enhance its performance within the realm 
of peace operations, is due to the inherent limitations present within organizations and 
their structures.  This congruence test will thus be conducted in two parts: 1) examine the 
intervention in Somalia in order to understand the effects that organizational 
consequences have upon peace interventions, and 2) explore the United Nations as an 
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organization in order to understand why the UN is having difficulty complying with the 
Brahimi Report recommendations.  
The data to be used in this analysis, therefore, includes the Brahimi Report 
recommendations, which specifically highlight particular failings of the UN, The Brahimi 
Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations (which will be referred to as the Stimson 
Center report) which outlines the recommendations the UN is having difficulty 
complying with, and Allison and Zelikow’s organizational theory framework as a tool to 
understand why the UN is having difficulty reforming.   
 The case study that I will use to highlight the consequences of the UN’s 
organizational failings on an intervention’s ability to achieve success is the Somalia 
intervention that took place in the early 1990s.  This operation was one of the most public 
and dramatic peace intervention failures of the 20th century.  As a result, the Somalia 
episode had resounding consequences.  The United States’ involvement in Somalia 
became a permanent black mark on the Clinton administration’s record, it ended the 
United Nations’ career of the esteemed Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and it 
also had profound effects on the United States future intervention policies, as well as the 
United Nations’ future intervention credibility.   
The Somalia episode, however, is important not only due to the dramatic effects 
that it had upon the international community and its most prominent figures, but more 
importantly, the Somalia intervention is quite unique in the way that the operation 
progressed.  The value of this particular peace operation is that it can be broken down 
into three connected and somewhat overlapping case studies: UNOSOM I, UNITAF, and 
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UNOSOM II; these studies can then be used to examine how the UN’s organizational 
features negatively impacted certain aspects and phases of the intervention more than 
others.  In particular, UNITAF, the US-led coalition, exemplifies how successful an 
intervention can be when it is not negatively impacted by organizational delays and 
inadequacies, as this particular phase of the operation was considered to be more or less 
successful in relation to its two counterparts.  UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II in turn, are 
perfect examples of the UN’s organizational failings necessarily hindering the 
effectiveness of intervening ground troops, i.e. the UN’s reliance on previously 
established routines and standard roles of operation and its consequential inability to 
adapt to conditions on the ground, as well as how the UN’s military organization and 
convoluted chains of command negatively affected its ability to effectively command the 
troops on the ground.   
While this analysis focuses solely on the United Nations organization and does 
not analyze any other international institutions or organizations, it explicitly addresses the 
failings of the organization to effectively act in one crucial area of responsibility – the 
maintenance of peace and security as embodied by UN peace operations.  This analysis, 
therefore, while applying solely to the UN, covers a multitude of responsibilities and 
organizational functions that apply to every peace operation as carried out by the United 
Nations.  This analysis, in turn, then affects each member state of the UN, particularly the 
members of the Security Council, who are primarily responsible for passing the 
resolutions that affect and legitimize UN peace operations.  
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Due to the fact that this report is based upon the recommendations as made by the 
widely accepted and respected Brahimi Report, it is reasonable to assume that these 
recommendations are clearly specific areas within which the UN is having difficulty 
operating smoothly, and further, that it is reasonable that this report focuses primarily on 
these particular problem areas.   
This approach is limited by the fact that I am not able to adequately compare my 
analysis and consequent conclusions to any other case studies – my examination of the 
UN as an organization focuses on applying the theoretical organizational framework to 
the UN in order to understand the entity and its failings within an organizational context, 
there is no element of comparison there.  This analysis, however, becomes more 
stabilized when applied to the concrete example of the UN intervention in Somalia.  Here 
the organizational failings of the UN become substantiated when applied to the analysis 
of the three parts of the peace operation (UNOMSOM I, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II).   
The fact that the United Nations is an organization is undisputed, and thus the 
analysis of the UN as an organization through the lens of organizational theory is a 
reasonable approach.  The analysis of the failings of the UN to comply with the Brahimi 
Report recommendations as examined through the lens of organizational theory, 
therefore, is a justified extension of this underlying foundation.  The reliability of this 
report, however, once this analysis is then applied to the UN’s failings as a capable 
intervention force is less clear.  The fact remains, however, that once the analysis of the 
particular failings of an intervention are traced back to the main executing body 
controlling the intervention, it is difficult to ignore the causal relationship that exists 
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between the organization and its subsequent intervention. Put in other words, once the 
failings of the UN intervention in Somalia are illustrated within a context that necessarily 
shows how the decisions made by UN officials were translated into the intervention 
forces’ mandate, troop structure, distribution, and chain of command, it is difficult if not 
impossible to acknowledge the findings of this report, i.e. that the UN’s organizational 
failings (as understood though the context of organizational theory) necessarily hinder the 
effectiveness of an intervening force on the ground.   
My approach and examination of the United Nations’ as an organization builds 
off the work of previous scholars, primarily the Brahimi Report, the Stimson analysis, 
and Allison and Zelikow’s theoretical organizational framework.  This analysis studies 
the characteristics of organizational bodies in order to apply an analytical framework to 
the United Nations in order to understand why the UN is having difficulty complying 
with the reforms as recommended by the Brahimi Report.  In this respect, my approach is 
partially based upon the foundational principle that underlies the Brahimi Report 
recommendations, i.e. 1) that the United Nations is failing to act as an effective and 
functioning international intervention force in order to secure peace and security for the 
international community, and 2) that there are specific organizational and bureaucratic 
functions of the organization that could be reformed in order to make the UN a more 
capable intervention force.  
The applicability of organizational theory to the study of UN peace operations 
became particularly relevant with the release of the Brahimi Report in 2000, and the 
follow-up report The Brahimi Report and the Future of Peace Operations by the Stimson 
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Center in 2003.  As became apparent in the Stimson Report, the United Nations has been 
unable to comply with a large number of the recommendations as made by the original 
Brahimi Report.  The question then is raised as to why the United Nations is having such 
difficulty implementing the Brahimi Report recommendations, and perhaps even more 
important with regards to the future of peace interventions, whether or not the UN is 
capable of effectively reforming itself at all.   
 The structure of the thesis is as follows.  Chapter two initially discusses the 
history of the United Nations, emphasizing the factors which were most influential upon 
the organization in its early years, while tracing the development of peacekeeping 
activities within the organization’s history.  Chapter three follows with an overview of 
the UN peace operation in Somalia, continuing with an analysis as to how the 
organizational structure of the United Nations negatively impacted several key 
components of the peace operations UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II.  Chapter four focuses 
on organizations in general through the development of an organizational theory 
framework as laid out by Allison and Zelikow.  The hypotheses of this theoretical 
framework are then applied to the United Nations in order to understand the UN within 
the context of the successes and failures of organizations in theory.  Chapter five uses the 
analysis of the United Nations within the organizational theory context to analyze why 
the UN is having difficultly complying with the peace intervention reforms as 
recommended by the Brahimi Report, analyzing how this difficulty stems from the 
organization's structural set-up by focusing on the particular weaknesses and/or failures 
of organizations as outlined in the fourth chapter.  Chapter six outlines what lays ahead 
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for the organization in terms of its peace intervention capabilities, using the United 
Nations’ success and failures with particular reforms as indications of what the UN is 
capable of achieving in terms of reform.  Finally, chapter seven concludes with a 
summation of the argument, reiterating the main points of the argument with a particular 
emphasis on reinforcing the importance of understanding and studying the United 
Nations as an organization rather than as an independent entity with capabilities of its 
own. 
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CHAPTER 2: HISTORY 
The creation of the United Nations following the end of the Second World War 
marked the beginning of a new phase in international politics.  The victorious allied 
powers had emerged from the war with a newfound determination to pursue the creation 
of an international institution that would embody the concept of “collective security” as 
so greatly desired by its founding members.  The United Nations’ primary purpose when 
conceived was to prevent the kinds of wars that had preceded it.  This newly structured, 
reinforced organization, it was hoped, would succeed where the League had failed.   
There were several important factors that shaped the UN’s creation and early 
involvement in international security.  First, and most important in terms of the actual 
Charter of the United Nations, was the legacy of the League of Nations.  The “legacy” of 
the League of Nations in the context of the creation of the United Nations refers primarily 
to the failure of the League to fulfill its primary purpose, which was to prevent any future 
world war.  A second influential factor was the legacy of the World War II victors’ 
alliance, which refers in this context, to the alliance of the great powers (USSR, the UK, 
and the US) forged during World War II to defeat the Axis powers.  The third influential 
factor that greatly affected the early involvement of the UN was the emerging Cold War.  
That is to say, whereas the actual inception and creation of the United Nations was 
motivated primarily by the legacy of the World War II alliance, and the victorious 
nations’ desire to create an international organization for collective security to prevent the 
horrors of another World War, the actual Charter of the United Nations was most greatly 
 21 
influenced by the failure of the League of Nations, as the framing powers attempted to 
rectify what had previously failed by implementing various safety measures within the 
design of a different framework; The actual implementation and result of the collective 
security of the UN and the organization’s early involvement in international security in 
turn, was most greatly affected by the emergence of the Cold War.   
The legacy of the World War II alliance was unquestionably one of the most 
important influential factors regarding the actual creation of the United Nations 
Organization.  As Ziring, Riggs, and Plano state, “The alliance that was eventually forged 
to defeat the Axis Powers and demand their unconditional surrender had assumed an 
identity as the United Nations.  It was for the purpose of sustaining that alliance once the 
war was over that the UN organization was created.”1  It was believed at the time that it 
was the responsibility of the great powers emerging victorious out of the Second World 
War to maintain security and stability within the international arena in order to prevent 
any future world wars.  This belief was the embodiment of FDR’s world vision for the 
future as captured by the phrase, the “Five Policemen.”2  This dream entailed the great 
powers, together, policing the security situation of the world. The main goal of the United 
Nations, therefore in this sense, was the continuance of the wartime cooperation in order 
to provide a stable, international situation for the future.   
The creation and structure of the Security Council, the executive organ of the 
United Nations, was also directly influenced by the legacy of the World War II alliance.  
                                                
1 Ziring, Riggs, and Plano, The United Nations, 23. 
2 Stephen Schlesinger, "FDR's Five Policemen: Creating the United Nations," World Policy Journal 11, no. 
3 (1994): 88. 
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The five largest states in the World War II UN coalition were made permanent members 
of the Security Council, each consequently given permanent veto power.3  The theory 
that informed the Charter’s authors was the notion of aligning responsibility with 
capability, in the sense that only the great powers were capable of effectively addressing 
issues of international security and thus, should be the only states involved in the 
decisions of international security matters.  The adoption of the veto itself reflected 
FDR’s belief that the Security Council would “actually run the UN” and followed 
Washington’s argument that there simply would not be a viable UN organization unless 
the five most powerful nations received veto rights (the five most powerful nations of 
course, coming out of World War II.)4  The primary cause of the Security Council’s 
decline over the years and since the creation of the United Nations can inevitably be 
traced back to the decline of the wartime alliance of the Soviet Union, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States, “the alliance whose continuation was the assumption 
upon which the idea of the Security Council was the guarantor of the peace constructed.”5  
As Goodrich states in “The UN Security Council,” contrary to the Charter-framer’s 
hopes, “the Allied unity broke down soon after the disappearance of the common 
enemies, and from the outset the Security Council had to carry the burdens beyond its 
capacity.”6  
Following the end of the Second World War and the creation of the United 
Nations, the organization’s founders were given the opportunity to fix what had failed in 
                                                
3 Ziring, Riggs, and Plano, The United Nations, 93. 
4 Schlesinger, "FDR's Five Policemen," 89. 
5 Leland M. Goodrich, "The UN Security Council," International Organization 12, no. 3 (1958): 283. 
6 Ibid. 
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the League of Nations.  In particular, the founders were given the chance to correct the 
structural problems that they believed had inherently inhibited the League’s ability to act 
in any given situation by creating a UN Charter that specifically addressed these 
particular weaknesses.  The main goal of the League of Nations as envisioned by 
President Woodrow Wilson was to prevent arbitrary aggression within the international 
arena by deterring states from attacking each other.  The League thus represented the first 
attempt at an international collective security organization.  The failure of the League of 
Nations, however, to respond to Japan’s invasion of Manchuria and Italy’s invasion of 
Ethiopia in the 1930s represented two abject failures of collective security in the years 
leading up to the Second World War.  The outbreak of World War II represented the final 
blow to the organization and its ultimate failure to live up to the primary objective for 
which it was created, the maintenance of peace and security.   
As Goodrich argues in “The UN Security Council,” “The peace and security 
provisions of the Charter appear to have been based in part on conclusions that were 
drawn by their authors with respect to the causes of the failure of the League system.”7  
He outlines four specific failures of the League as perceived by the UN Charter framers 
and then discusses how these failures were translated into and compensated for in the UN 
Charter.  First, he argues that because the framers believed that the one of the major 
causes of the failure of the League was the organization’s lack of universality, and in 
particular the absence of the United States, the first concern of the Charter-makers was to 
insure that all major powers, mainly the United States and the Soviet Union, were 
                                                
7 Ibid.: 273. 
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members of the international organization.8  Second, the belief that the primary weakness 
of the League system was its provision that “sanctions should be applied against every 
aggressor, irrespective of whether or not it was a major power, and whether or not all 
major powers joined in applying them” led the Charter-framers to stress the need for 
agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council as a condition of 
enforcement action.9   
Third, the Charter-framers were adamant that an effective military force be at the 
disposal of the Organization when necessary in order to account for another failure of the 
League system, which was the absence of any effective provision for the use of military 
force, and the unwillingness in particular, of certain member-states in agreeing to military 
action against aggressors.10  Thus, under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, Member States 
are required to resolve their disputes peacefully, a rule enforceable under the provisions 
of Chapter VII, which give the Security Council the authority to enforce peace when 
faced with threats or breaches of peace or with acts of aggression.  As the often quoted 
Article 39 states, “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain 
or restore international peace and security.”11  In addition, the Charter also requires 
Member States to commit military support (including the contribution of military troops) 
to be ready for Security Council deployment.  This extremely useful provision of the 
                                                
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11Dennis Dijkzeul, Reforming For Results in the UN System: A Study of UNOPS (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 2000).  
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Charter, though still unfulfilled today, seems to have been a direct attempt at solving one 
of the fundamental obstacles the UN faces as an organization in regards to peace 
operations—troop contributions as supplied voluntarily by Member States.  
Lastly, it was perceived at the time that the League was weakened by the failure 
of its Covenant to explicitly define the limits and responsibilities of its primary organs, 
thus the Charter authors sought to clearly define the limits of the UN’s Security Council 
and General Assembly.12  In this sense, the legacy of the League was extremely important 
in shaping the creation of the United Nations in that it directly influenced the Charter of 
the organization itself.   
The emergence of the Cold War was the most important factor influencing the 
UN’s early involvement in international affairs.  As mentioned before, the United 
Nations’ primary purpose when conceived was to prevent the kinds of wars that had 
preceded it.  The UN, however, was not equipped to handle the new political realities of 
the Cold War. As Urquhart outlines in “The Next Secretary-General”, “the Cold War and 
the nightmare reality of the US-Soviet ‘balance of terror’[…] soon imposed new demands 
on the U.N..  Far from realizing the San Francisco dream of an organized peace – 
monitored and, if necessary, enforced by the major wartime Allies […] the new 
organization became occupied with preventing a cataclysmic nuclear confrontation 
between its key members.”13  Thus, as Ziring, Riggs, and Plano state in The United 
Nations, the “collective security as envisioned by the Charter never became a reality, and 
                                                
12 Goodrich, "The UN Security Council." 
13 Brian Urquhart, "The Next Secretary-General: How to Fill a Job with No Description " Foreign Affairs 
85, no. 5 (2006): 16. 
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even the voluntary version of military enforcement action has been attempted 
sparingly.”14 Thus, in the sixty-years since its creation, the organization developed other 
ways to assert its presence as a relevant force in the realm of international violence, 
namely UN peacekeeping. 
Traditionally, peacekeeping was seen as part of a UN strategy to prevent the 
escalation of local disputes or power vacuums from further escalating or aggravating the 
Cold War balances of power.15 The foundational tenants of traditional peacekeeping 
missions required the consent of the involved parties, impartiality of intervening troops, 
and a minimum use of force doctrine entailing that force be used only in proportion to the 
threat faced and only in self-defense.  These foundational tenants reflect the sanctity of 
state sovereignty as viewed at the time, and the idea that traditional peacekeeping was 
meant to keep the peace between states, and was not to interfere with a state’s sovereign 
right to manage its own internal affairs.   
The realities of the Cold War also greatly affected the UN’s first exercise of 
collective security in the Korean War.  Prevention of the spread of the Soviet Bloc was 
long a concern of US foreign policy, and greatly influenced the American’s decision to 
enter into the Korean War.  Although considered the UN’s first “successful” peace 
operation, the only factor that enabled the initial Security Council decision in the first 
place was the absence of the Soviet delegate at the time of the vote.  The Korean War 
later demonstrated, however, how a lack of consensus among its permanent members 
could prohibit the Security Council from taking decisive, collective action against an 
                                                
14 Ziring, Riggs, and Plano, The United Nations, 213. 
15 Ibid., 214. 
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aggressor nation.  With the return of the Soviet delegate in August of 1950, the United 
States managed to circumvent the Soviet bloc by invoking the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution, which was adopted by the assembly in early November that same year.16  
This resolution allowed the General Assembly to act in times when the Security Council 
could not.  Although initially condemned as illegal by the Soviets, this resolution became 
increasingly important and was used more frequently by the Soviets in later years when 
America no longer had an overwhelming majority in the General Assembly.   
The limited view of peacekeeping operations as seen as part of a UN strategy to 
prevent the escalation of local disputes or power vacuums from further escalating the 
Cold War balances of power did not fit well for the more complex situations that arose 
following the end of the Cold War.17  Beginning in the early 1990s, the stabilizing 
tendencies which had characterized the previous forty years ended abruptly, causing the 
emergence of ethnic conflicts, lengthy civil wars, and failed states.  Thus, the concept of 
preventive diplomacy, once so strictly defined, began to acquire a broader meaning into 
the 1990s as UN peacekeeping forces were sent into increasingly complicated areas of 
conflict.  These operations were involved in the internal affairs of states, had unclear and 
disputed mandates, and were much more complex and costly than traditional 
peacekeeping operations.  There was thus a shift, beginning in the early 1990s, regarding 
the sanctity of a state’s sovereignty as states were no longer unconditionally protected 
from external interference.  Instead, there was an increasing tendency to view issues of 
human security (and possible violations of a state’s obligation to fulfill basic human 
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securities and rights) as overriding a states’ claim to internal sovereignty.  It became, 
within this context, not only the international community’s right to intervene, but also its 
legal obligation to intervene in situations of gross human rights violations.   
This expansion of UN operations involved a redefinition or a proliferation of the 
terms used to describe their actions. Before 1990, the maintenance of peace by the United 
Nations was more restricted. These operations were more “traditional”, i.e. in conforming 
with the definition as stated by Urquhart, “the use by the United Nations of a military 
force not to engage in fighting or restraining sides, but to intervene as a mechanism to put 
an end to the hostilities and act as a plug between hostile forces. In fact, the military force 
is an instrument of international legitimacy which facilitates the end of engagements and 
contributes to the maintenance of the cease-fire.”18 Indeed these operations were 
deployed whenever the three principles of operational procedures were clearly defined: 
assent, impartiality, and use of the force in the event of self-defense. 
Beginning in the 1990s, however, the term “maintenance of peace” or peace 
keeping was used in a more general way. An action was described as peacekeeping when, 
as Liegeois states in Maintien de la Paix et Diplomatie Coercitive, “one uses the military 
tools of conquest to achieve ends other than objectives of conquest or objectives of 
national interest [... and ] that the armed force is not employed to destroy an adversary 
but aims to influence or coerce.”19 
                                                
18  Michel Liegeois, Maintien de la Paix et Diplomatie Coercitive: L'organisation des Nations Unies à 
l'épreuve des conflits de l'après-guerre froide. (Bruxelles: Belgique Bruylant, 2003), 51-52 (translation by 
Lauren Chang). 
19 Ibid., 51. 
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With regard to the interventions themselves, Liegeois outlines six characteristics 
which constitute a proper involvement. First, the “U.N.” character of the operation: 
peacekeeping forces act under the order and the control of the Secretary-General within 
the mandate of an operation as approved by the Security Council or General Assembly; 
second, the consent of the involved parties and the need for a preliminary cease-fire, two 
fundamental requirements that underlie the concept of operation peacekeeping; third, the 
impartiality of the force: blue helmet forces must be completely impartial and function 
without prejudice to the rights and aspirations of the involved parties; fourth, the 
composition of the UN forces must reflect the universality of the United Nations as an 
organization, i.e. there must be a multinational and balanced composition quota; fifth, the 
restriction of the use of the force except in self-defense; finally sixth, blue helmet forces 
take few risks and accept a minimum number of causalities.20 
These principles, though well accepted at the beginning of the second or activist 
era (1988-1994), became increasingly stretched as the era unfolded.  In particular, the 
operational applicability of three principles (consent, impartiality, and use of force only 
in self defense) was called into question in missions where UN contingents confronted 
recurring resistance to the implementation of UN mandates.    
Over the past two decades, the UN has had numerous opportunities to experiment 
with these types of complex interventions.  In terms of the organization’s response to 
humanitarian crises and potential genocides, however, the UN’s ability to act effectively 
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and decisively has been disappointing.  Nonetheless, it is important to study the context 
of these notorious failures, including Somalia, in order to understand whether we should 
be so quick to condemn the UN as fundamentally unable to respond to these types of 
crises, or perhaps more optimistically, discover important failings that exist within the 
organization that contributed to these recent failures, that if corrected, might enable the 
UN to act more effectively and successfully in the future. 
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CHAPTER 3: MISSION TO SOMALIA 
This chapter explores the UN intervention in Somalia as a concrete example to 
point out specific instances in which the organizational failings of the United Nations 
negatively impacted the degree of success of the three intervention phases (UNOSOM I, 
UNITAF, and UNOSOM II).   
Somalia emerged from colonialism and first became a nation in 1960, when 
Britain and Italy granted independence to their respective sectors.  The new, 
inexperienced government immediately faced difficulties when it failed to meet the 
expectations of the people.  Had Britain or Italy adequately prepared the new government 
in order to prepare for a successful transition to democracy, it is unknown how the future 
of Somalia might have changed.  As it was however, Somalia quickly escalated from a 
short-termed stable peace, to an unstable peace, with tensions within the populace rising.   
In 1969, this unstable peace broke into a confrontation with the assassination of 
President Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke and slid into crises as the army, led by General 
Mohamed Siad Barre, seized power, dissolved the legislature and arrested all government 
leaders.  General Barre became the new president of the renamed Somali Democratic 
Republic until he fled the country in late January of 1991, having lost most of his army, 
tanks, and planes in the eight-month conflict with Ethiopia.   
His departure left control of Somalia in the hands of feuding clan-based guerilla 
forces.  The most powerful of the Southern groups was the United Somalia Congress 
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(USC), which was formed in 1989 by the Hawiye clan.1  This clan then split in 1991 into 
sub-clan groupings, one group consisting of moderate businessmen and political leaders 
attempting to find a peaceful solution to the crises.  One of these business men, Ali 
Mahdi Mohammed soon began contending for power with General Mohammed Farah 
Aideed, part of the Habr Gadir sub-clan faction.  Once the rebel factions began fighting 
among themselves, the conflict in Somalia escalated into war.  Tens of thousands of 
Somalis were killed while these conflicts spread across the country, particularly ravaging 
an area in Somalia known as the Triangle of Death.2  
With the destruction of the local economy and the displacement of hundreds of 
thousands of Somalis, the situation in Somalia was further complicated by a two-year 
drought that hit east Africa.3  Food became “a source both of power and of conflict, since 
it had replaced currency as the major source of wealth and exchange.”4  It was at this 
point that the newly appointed secretary general Boutros Boutros-Ghali began 
encouraging the Security Council to take urgent measures to end the fighting.  The 
council adopted Resolution 733 in January 1992, engaging in coercive diplomacy (the 
employment of threats or limited force to persuade an opponent to call off or undo an 
encroachment) by establishing a total arms embargo, urging “an immediate cease-fire 
[and] establish[ing] a humanitarian relief effort,” inviting interested parties to come to 
New York for discussions.5   
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5 Ibid., 84. 
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In February 1992, Mahdi and Aideed, who both laid claim to the presidency, 
agreed in principle to a cease-fire which was signed in March.  The Security Council then 
authorized the deployment of fifty UN peacekeepers to Somalia, (UNOSOM I), to 
monitor the cease-fire and to help secure the passage of relief convoys.  Peacekeeping 
missions, which require the consent of parties, consist of lightly armed military forces.  
As Mohamed Sahnoun states in Coercive Inducement, at the peak of its mission, 
UNOSOM I consisted of 500 peacekeepers who were “armed primarily with moral 
authority,” the UN mission relying to a large extent on “moral suasion to get things done.  
When belligerent cooperation did not materialize, the mission failed.”6   
In December of 1992, the Security Council accepted the U.S. offer to lead a 
coalition force operating under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to help secure delivery of 
relief supplies.7  Thus the Security Council changed its mandate, transitioning from its 
earlier policy which consisted of, as Clarke and Herbst state in Learning From Somalia, 
“hamstrung Peacekeepers intervention force,” to a “large scale humanitarian 
Peacemaking intervention ‘in order to transform Southern Somalia into a secure 
environment.’”8  Operation Restore Hope was thus launched in December 1992 in order 
to relieve the suffering and starvation of the Somali people.9 The Unified Task Force 
intervention force was required to work closely with the humanitarian organizations that 
had been carrying out relief activities in Somalia since March of 1991.   
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This mission, called UNITAF, was authorized to act forcefully and without local 
consent if necessary.  They consisted of heavily armed combat forces whose mandate was 
to “establish a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid, and then expand 
that environment into a framework that would allow turnover of the mission to a UN 
force.”10  Due to its overwhelming military capabilities and subsequent advantages, 
UNITAF’s credibility was never questioned, and Ambassador Oakley took advantage of 
this military force to begin “using the implicit threat of coercion…as well as persuasion 
[and] pressure” with both parties.11  
The UNITAF mandate did not call for the use of force.  Coercive inducement was 
the method that worked in order to establish cooperation and a beginning to the end of the 
conflict.  “From the U.S. perspective the mission was twofold: establish a secure 
environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid, and then expand that environment into 
a framework that would allow turnover of the mission to a UN force.” 12 Using coercive 
inducement as a method to deal with the parties, the United States took the initiative to 
try and bring order to Somalia with the idea that the UN would be following their 
footsteps when it came to dealing with Somalia.   
UNITAF was politically and nationally accepted, because of its efficiency.  Both 
sides of the conflict were working with UNITAF because UNITAF presented a credible 
threat and established trust with both sides.  UNITAF pursued voluntary disarmament, 
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which is a factor that led the parties away from conflict. UNITAF was thus partial only to 
its mission, had a good reputation and was prepared for its mandate. 13 
Another factor that strengthened the legitimacy of the UNITAF operation was the 
existence of continuing cooperation between the U.S. forces in UNITAF, the 
humanitarian organizations, and the UN.  For example, UNITAF created the Civil 
Military Operations Center which cooperated with the government and non-governmental 
organizations, and therefore produced unity.  Also, UNITAF split forces into eight 
humanitarian relief sectors, demonstrating its delegation capabilities. 14  When UNITAF 
did decide to use force, they established committees and talked to the factions, explaining 
their actions and showing their impartiality. 15  With coercive inducement methods, 
UNITAF was handling the arguments presented by the war lords and their threats. 16  
UNITAF, therefore, followed its mandate, which included the establishment of an 
environment conducive to humanitarian aide and a consequent turnover to the UN forces.  
On March 3, 1993, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his 
recommendations for effecting the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. He 
indicated that since the adoption of Council resolution 794 in December 1992, the 
presence and operations of UNITAF (UNITAF deployed some 37,000 personnel over 
forty percent of southern and central Somalia) had a positive impact on the security 
situation in Somalia and on the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance.  However, 
there was still no effective government, police or national army, which resulted in serious 
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security threats to UN personnel.  It was for that reason that the Security Council, with 
Resolution 814, officially authorized the creation of UNOSOM II.  It endowed 
UNOSOM II with the powers to establish a secure environment throughout Somalia, and 
to achieve national reconciliation so as to create a democratic state.  Resolution 814 in 
particular, specified the need for disarmament and the demobilization of the militia units 
and warring factions.  Complete disarmament was an important step that the UN had 
wanted UNITAF to fulfill, but that the United States had refused to do on account of the 
limits of their established mandate.    
UNITAF was an unqualified success in regards to the first part of its mandate, 
however the problems began when UNITAF began handing off the operation to 
UNOSOM II.  The creation of UNOSOM II was authorized under a chapter VII mandate, 
with a new mandate much broader than that of either UNOSOM I or UNITAF.  The 
mandate stated that UNOSOM II was supposed to protect the delivery of humanitarian 
relief, as well as consolidate, expand, and maintain a secure environment for the 
advancement of economic assistance and the political reconciliation of the government. 17  
This was a key moment in the operation, when the mandate shifted from delivering food 
supplies to nation building.  In March of 1993, due to the fact that the United States felt 
that they had achieved their mission, there was a transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM 
II.  However, despite the new mandate, the resources and international political support 
did not follow.  
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UNOSOM II's attempts to implement disarmament led to violence. On June 5, 
1993, twenty-four Pakistani troops in the UN force were killed in an ambush in an area of 
Mogadishu controlled by Aideed. Any hope of a peaceful resolution of the conflict 
quickly vanished. The next day, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 
837 calling for the arrest and trial of those responsible for the ambush.  
One of the terrible results of Resolution 837 occurred on July 12, 1993 during an 
operation carried out by the United States on a house in Mogadishu. This house was 
believed to have been the gathering place of the clan of Aidid Habr Gedir who were 
supposedly planning violent actions against the United States and the United Nations 
forces. Unfortunately, it is thought today that US intelligence reports were faulty, and the 
targeted house contained only the respected elders of the clan. According to UN officers, 
the agenda of the meeting (which was published in the local newspaper) was related to 
negotiations in order to solve the conflict between Aideed and the multinational working 
group in Somalia, and to perhaps even remove Aideed as leader of the clan. 
On July 7, 1993, the military operation that proceeded took seventeen minutes of 
combat during which American helicopters fired sixteen TOW missiles and thousands of 
twenty millimeter cartridges.  As the dust cleared and the firing had stopped, the dead 
bodies of fifty of the oldest, and most respected members of the clan and community lay 
buried in the debris.  Many think that these events were crucial in unifying the Somalis 
against the United States and UN efforts.  The angered mobs quickly attacked four 
American journalists who were reporting the event, dragging their lynched bodies 
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through the streets. At this point in time President Clinton decided to withdraw American 
forces. 
As Daniel, Hayes, and de Jonge Oudraat state in Coercive Diplomacy, 
“UNOSOM II was challenged […] because it appeared weak.  Its contingents were 
feuding, its objectives were unclear, and it had not demonstrated the political will 
necessary to carry out a conflict against Aideed, even though it in effect declared war on 
him.” 18  UNOSOM II clearly did not have the credibility or the consequential 
effectiveness of UNITAF because it lacked the force to back up its declarations of war.  
The UNOSOM goal of assisting the process of political reconstruction became less 
feasible as time progressed, and in November of 1994, absent any political reconciliation 
and a deteriorating security situation, the UNSC ordered a total withdrawal of UNOSOM 
by March 31, 1995. 19    
Aftereffects of the Somalia Intervention  
The effect that the Somalia intervention had upon UN peace operations was 
profound, particularly with regard to the United States’ attitudes towards participating in 
future interventions.  Following the hasty withdrawal of American troops after the Black 
Hawk Down debacle in Mogadishu, the Clinton administration suffered heavy 
humiliation in regards to the failures it experienced in Somalia.  And while the United 
States continued to deflect blame for the American deaths onto the United Nations, it 
became very clear that the United States would no longer be willing to engage itself in 
complicated humanitarian operations.  The psychological aftereffects of the Somalia 
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intervention and the subsequent doubts that plagued not only the United States, but also 
the entire international system in regards to the feasibility of massive multilateral 
humanitarian interventions, became known as the “Somalia Syndrome.”  This syndrome 
is argued to be one of the main factors that contributed to the Clinton administration’s 
failure to intervene in the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.  Any hopes that subsequent 
United States’ administrations might shift from this retreat in international peace 
operations was shattered when George Bush entered the Presidential office in 2001.  
President Bush made it clear that there was little desire in the new administration to 
operate U.S. foreign policy through the world organization.20   
Organizational Failings 
In terms of the organizational factors that negatively impacted the chances of 
success for the UN peace intervention in Somalia, there were several problems.   
Mandate 
First, perhaps most crucial to the potential success or failure of an operation, is the 
operation’s mandate.  Michel Liegeois, author of Maintien de la Paix et Diplomatie 
Coercitive, recognizes the importance of a clearly interpretable mandate when he argues 
that the negative impact the mandate had upon the outcome of the Somalia mission was a 
main factor contributing to its failure.  He specifies that, “at the strategic level, the 
divergences of interpretation of the mandate led to the rupture in the unity of the chain of 
command and led to the development of interferences between the UN command and the 
leaders of the major national states and their constituents, finally, at the operational level, 
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the troops experienced the difficulty in executing a multiform and changing mandate, in 
the absence of honest cooperation of the parties.”21   
Donald C.F. Daniel, Bradd C. Hayes, and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat argue that 
one of the final dooming factors of the Somalia intervention was the lack of a clear 
political objective as incorporated by the operation mandates.  The authors argue that the 
diplomatic and political dimensions of a situation guide intervention forces and 
operations towards a common goal, stating that one of the lessons from Somalia is that, 
“whatever measure of success a force achieves, it will be short-lived unless it is guided 
by a comprehensive concept of operations and a clear political objective.”22  The drive to 
enforce control over the warring parties at all costs is cited as an ultimate failure of the 
United Nations’ operation, which overly emphasized the military objectives of the 
operation while simultaneously failing to produce the adequate force needed to wrestle 
control of the situation away from the warring clans from the beginning.  
As Jett states in Why Peacekeeping Fails, “The mandate can doom the PKO to 
failure if it sets objectives that cannot be achieved, especially if it is unaccompanied by 
insufficient resources to achieve those objectives.  Mandates can also suffer from too 
much ambiguity or from leaving the parties themselves with too much to accomplish on 
their own.”23  Thus, weak mandates that lack a political objective and result in varied 
interpretations are often a result of the organizational structure of the United Nations, 
which requires not only the cooperation and agreement of all Security Council members, 
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but also member state troop contributions as well.  As Jett states, “Security Council 
mandates, by their very nature, will continue to embody political compromises reflecting 
the competing interests of Member States. As such they are unlikely ever to satisfy a 
ground commander’s wish for an ‘unambiguous mission statement,’ a wish that in any 
UN-mounted peace-keeping operation is likely to be unfulfilled.”24  
UNOSOM I, a strict Chapter VI peacekeeping operation under the UN Charter, 
had a limited mandate, and was designed only to uphold the existing ceasefire and assist 
in humanitarian relief efforts.  In addition, although up to 3000 more troops were allotted 
to fulfill the UNOSOM I mandate, the remaining troops were never supplied and the 
mission failed to reach its optimal strength.  When rebels continued to threaten the 
security situation by looting humanitarian relief supplies that were intended for starving 
Somalis, turning food that was intended for aid into a source of wealth and exchange in 
the country, the UN troops were not allowed to pursue or take any sort of action against 
the raiding Somalis.25 Even worse, the Pakistani forces that comprised the UN mission 
became virtual hostages at the airport, unable to provide security to themselves, let alone 
others.  As a result, the UN troops were ill-equipped to respond to the rapidly 
deteriorating situation.   
The UNITAF operation was sanctioned under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and 
could subsequently act with force, if necessary, to fulfill the operation’s mandate.  The 
mandate ordered that the intervening forces use, “all necessary means to establish as soon 
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as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.”26  The 
ability of the troops to sufficiently act under these terms was never questioned as the 
UNITAF troops, though “lightly” armed by normal combat standards, were among the 
most heavily armed troops in Somalia.27 What was problematic about the mission’s 
mandate, however, was its failure to address the issue of disarmament of the rebel forces 
in Somalia, an issue upon which the United Nations and the United States strongly 
disagreed.  The United States did not feel that full-scale disarmament of the rebel forces 
in Somalia fell under the exact mission for which it was sanctioned, i.e. to establish a 
secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid and then to expand that 
environment into a framework that would allow for the turnover of the mission to a 
subsequent UN force.28 Full-scale disarmament was never pursued by UNITAF to the 
dismay of the United Nations, and was left instead to the UN.  This disagreement over a 
very particular yet fundamental component of the mission’s mandate had significant 
consequences for the success of the operation in the months to come.  It is believed that if 
the force of UNITAF been used more effectively to pursue a sufficient disarmament in 
order to provide for long-term security, UNOSOM II would have been able to achieve its 
post-conflict peacebuilding objectives realistically.  Instead UNOSOM II had to re-
concentrate its efforts in peace enforcement activities, such as trying to forcibly bring the 
warring parties to peace, which is something the UN historically does not have a 
successful track record with.   
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UNOSOM II is a perfect example of what not to do in regards to an operation’s 
mandate.  The operation’s mandate was first of all broader than that of either UNOSOM I 
or UNITAF.  As Daniel, Hayes, and de Jonge Oudraat state in Coercive Inducement, “not 
only was UNOSOM II supposed to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief, it was also 
supposed to consolidate, expand, and maintain a secure environment for the advancement 
of economic assistance and the political reconciliation of the government.”29  The 
UNOSOM II mandate clearly bit off more than it could chew, equipped with fewer troops 
and greater responsibilities.  In addition, the UNOSOM II mandate kept changing in an 
attempt to respond to situations on the ground.  The mandate was expanded to investigate 
armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel with resolution 814 (1993) and 837 (1993), 
authorized with a Commission of Inquiry with resolution 885 (1993), extended by 
resolution 878 (1993)30…and so on, resulting, eventually, in six extensions of the 
duration of the operation in addition to reductions in size and mandate along the way.31   
As Jett states, “the operation’s mandate was vague, changed frequently during the process 
and was open to myriad interpretations.”32 This greatly impacted the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the troops on the ground.  
Force Structure 
 Second, in terms of the force structures used for UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II, 
the United Nation’s reliance on member state contributions greatly restricted the UN’s 
attempts to piece together a military force for the actual operation, let alone a military 
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force that had similar equipment, training, doctrine, and operational methods.33  By late 
1992, the UN had become frustrated by Member States’ inability and/or unwillingness to 
contribute the troops necessary to form what would have been an active intervention 
force – UNOSOM I.   The key word here is “active,” meaning that the troops would have 
to have been sufficiently equipped and trained to deal with the deteriorating security 
situation, armed not only with the actual weaponry needed to take control and secure the 
delivery of humanitarian aid, but also with the accompanying mandate required to back 
the forceful coercion of the warring factions.  The United Nations was then forced to 
subcontract out to the United States to undertake the next phase of the mission, UNITAF.  
The United Nations left all decisions about force structure, command and control, and 
military objectives of UNITAF to the United States and the other members of the 
multinational task force who were clearly not subjected to the same slow ad hoc 
mechanisms and improvised management procedures as those at the United Nations.34   
UNOSOM II, created as a direct result of the U.S. plan for UNITAF, was 
intended to facilitate the transition from UNITAF to a long-term, more expansive UN 
operation.  Whereas American leaders envisioned that UNOSOM II troops be as heavily 
armed and readily equipped as their UNITAF comrades, the resulting forces that 
eventually comprised the UNOSOM II operation consisted primarily of lightly armed 
Third World forces.  The majority of the troops that were contributed by Member States 
were much better suited to perform traditional peacekeeping duties rather than the peace 
enforcement tasks that were at hand.  In addition, as Hillen states in Blue Helmets, 
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“UNOSOM II did not have the air mobility of UNITAF, which had predicated its 
operations on extensive aviation assets used for both transport and combat support…The 
ratio of combat troops to lightly armed peacekeeping or logistics troops was much lower 
for UNOSOM II in its crucial first months than for the combat-heavy UNITAF.”35 
Jonathan Howe, the special representative of the secretary-general to Somalia also noted 
that UNOSOM II, rather than being structured as based on a rational calculus of military 
planning considerations, was instead composed of the disparate leftovers from UNOSOM 
I, UNITAF, and “whatever volunteers the secretary-general could mobilize during UN 
peacekeeping’s busiest year.”36 In addition, in contrast to nation-states or well-rehearsed 
military alliances with permanent planning bureaus (such as NATO), the United Nations 
was not equipped with the luxury of working off of prepackaged force structures and 
plans.37  The UN was thus working from scratch instead of building off of force 
structures that had been executed before, and thus was unable to readily adjust these 
structures to changing situations on the ground.   
Chains of Command 
Third, the chains of command as organized through the United Nations greatly 
impacted the success of the forces on the ground, particularly during the third phase of 
the Somalia operation.  UNITAF, arguably the most successful phase of the entire 
Somalia intervention, had the advantage of being supported, controlled, and backed by 
the greatest military power in the world, the United States Armed Forces.  UNITAF’s 
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operations and activities were based upon American procedures with, as Hillen states, 
“political and military command and control arrangements…rooted in the significant 
capabilities and rehearsed institutions of a major military power.”38 UNITAF thus had the 
institutional advantage of clear-cut chains of command as based upon specific procedures 
that have never been available to the United Nations.39  
UNOSOM II, however, the first UN-commanded mission with a Chapter VII 
mandate, lacked a trained and rehearsed chain of command and did not have a common 
set of control procedures.40 The United Nations was thus forced to improvise whenever 
faced with a particularly difficult or confusing military situation.  And though 
improvisation in the battlefield is not necessarily a dooming factor of an operation, the 
United Nations’ troops were not backed by a strong or legitimate military framework 
capable of adapting and responding to the changing conditions.41 As a result, troops were 
often paralyzed by confusion in regards to conflicting orders and criss-crossing chains of 
command.  This resulted in lack of credibility on the field, an element essential to the 
success of an intervening force. When UNOSOM II faced a significant military obstacle, 
these problems were greatly exacerbated and the frailty of an ad hoc coalition with no 
real command authority was exposed.”42 As Chester Crocker states as cited in Hillen’s 
Blue Helmets, “The United Nation’s attempt at a militarily challenging ‘peace 
enforcement’ operation shows that it cannot manage complex political-military 
operations when its own structure is an undisciplined and often chaotic set of rival 
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fiefdoms that resist unified command and control in the field and at both civilian and 
military levels.”43  
Concluding Remarks 
When contrasting the differences between UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II and the US-
led coalition task force UNITAF, the organizational failings of the United Nations 
significantly impacted three fundamental components that affect an operations’ chance of 
success: the mandate, the force structure, and the command and control of an 
intervention.  The story of the UN operations in Somalia thus helps to demonstrate the 
importance and relevance of this thesis, which is to understand 1) how the UN is failing 
organizationally in regards to peace intervention activities, 2) what attempts have been 
made to understand and fix these failings (i.e. the Brahimi Report), and 3) why the UN 
has been unable to comply with certain aspects of the recommended reforms thus far.  
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CHAPTER 4: ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY  
The United Nations as an Organization 
 As Ziring, Riggs, and Plano highlight in The United Nations, the emergence of 
international institutions in the early 19th century can be attributed to the need that 
existed for an innovative response to the problems of approaching common issues such as 
commerce, communication, and transportation.1 With the rise of democracy in the 
western world and the growing acceptance of multilateral approaches and responses to 
international concerns, the stage was set for the emergence of modern international 
organization.2  The creation of international organizations, which help to solve procedural 
and practical objectives, was actually facilitated by the growing numbers of emerging 
democratic states who were familiar with and privy to the fundamental element of 
international organizations which is the consensual process.3  
 As the development of international organizations progressed towards the end of 
the 19th century, new patterns of institutional arrangements arose that, while particularly 
unique in some respects to the individual organization, also contained common 
characteristics which resembled the fundamental setups of other organizations in general.  
These common characteristics included: each organization was created through the 
signing of a multilateral treaty, organizational membership was limited to sovereign 
states, the use of conferences as basic policy-making organs, an executive council with 
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limited membership designed to administer the broad policy decisions as laid down by 
the general members, financial support as provided by the contributions from member 
states, the designed focus of the organization as outlined in its founding constitution, 
consensus decision making by either drafting international treaties and submitting them 
to be ratified by member states or by creating resolution recommending action on behalf 
of member governments.4  
 These common elements as embodied by the newly created international 
organizations allowed scholars to pursue studies within organizational theory which 
included the study of the nature of organizations themselves, as well as the study of 
individual entities and group dynamics in an organizational setting.  Organizational 
theory thus attempts to map, model and understand the factors that come into play 
whenever individual actors or groups of actors interact in organizations.   
Introduction to Organizational Theory 
Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow provide a particularly relevant examination of 
organizational theory in their book entitled, Essence of Decision.  They argue that 
government behavior, traditionally analyzed as a unitary, rational decision maker, can be 
better understood by applying an alternative framework that realizes government actions 
and decisions more as “outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard 
patterns of behavior.”5  They argue that organizational behavior operates according to 
pre-established routines, and that while organizations can and sometimes do change over 
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time, this adaptation is usually in response to a major disaster.  They outline five points 
regarding international organization which explain: why organizations are created, what 
functions and roles organizations are involved in, the constraining behavior of 
organizations, how an organizational culture emerges from the creation of an 
organization, and lastly how organizations are less analogous to an individual, and more 
analogous to a technology or “bundle of technologies.”6 
 They refute the traditional rationalist or instrumental approach to organizations by 
arguing that simply studying the purpose(s) for which a particular organization was 
created does not necessarily explain the behavior of that organization.  They argue that 
organizations must adapt, causing many to move away from the creator’s intended vision 
for the organization and become active participants in deciding how various goals or 
intended purposes will be realized in action.7  They believe that organizations should be 
understood more as a process in which the “organizational objectives to perform a 
specific task also influences the organization’s culture.”8  Thus, an organization affects 
the way in which a particular situation or action is interpreted by providing comparative 
past experiences that are consequently used by organization members to adequately 
respond to the situation.  
The differences between the “paradigm of efficiency” and the “paradigm of 
culture” are outlined regarding several key aspects of organization, but the authors focus 
primarily on the key point where the two approaches converge, the mission of an 
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organization, and in particular, “the creation of special capacities linked to operational 
objectives oriented toward performance of specific tasks, and reliance on associated 
routines.”9  In this sense, the organizational logic is an independent variable that affects 
an organizations behavior which consequently, is not completely determined by 
previously established routines.   
Particularly relevant to this analysis is the authors’ discussion of the potential for 
“dangerous dysfunctionality,” referring to the damaging results that occur when an 
organization attempts to superimpose new, unfamiliar tasks onto old, previously 
established routines.10  The result, they argue, is that “the interactions defy ready 
understanding and can magnify the consequences of small failures, which are 
inevitable.”11  The analysis concludes by outlining a context within which to analyze 
organizations and their behavior within the realm of international politics and foreign 
policy.12  Relevant topics include their discussion of Organizational Missions; their 
discussion of Action as Organizational Output and in particular, the negative effects that 
a set of standard operating procedures can have upon the efficiency of an organization; 
their analysis of how dramatic performance failures affects organizational learning and 
change; as well as their discussion of the Central Coordination and Control of an 
organization; and the lack of feasibility in an organization’s ability to engage in Directed 
Change.13  
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Propositions and Hypotheses  
In order to analyze the successes and failures of the United Nations in complying 
with the Brahimi Report recommendations, there are several important hypotheses as 
introduced by Allison and Zelikow in Essence of Decision that, when applied to the study 
of the United Nations, help to explain its behavior in regards to the report.  
First, the current attempts towards reform within the United Nations can be 
explained by the dramatic performance failures that the UN peacekeeping missions 
experienced in the 1990s.  When organizational bodies experience failures to perform in 
the capacity for which they were originally created, these failures radically affect the 
learning curve of the organization and its subsequent ability and desire to change.  As 
Allison and Zelikow state, “Dramatic change occurs usually in response to major 
disasters.  In these circumstances the organization’s culture can be so shocked or 
discredited that mission, operational objectives, special capacities are all redefined, 
creating a new culture.”14  This applies quite clearly to the United Nations by explaining 
the motivation for the original Brahimi Report and subsequent attempts to reform the UN 
as a result of the failures of UN peacekeeping and peacemaking interventions in the 
1990s.    
Second, in regards to the UN Charter and the resulting structure of peace 
operations as managed organizationally and deployed in the field, the foundation of an 
organization and the consequential manner in which it was organized is extremely 
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influential upon the ability of an organization to adapt to shifting conditions.  As Allison 
and Zelikow state,  
Whether missions are stated more formally or more vaguely, many 
organizations […] have an explicit, brief mission statement that seeks to 
define for their members and customers what businesses they are in and 
what they seek to accomplish.  Many government organizations have 
formal charters that specify their authorities, the arenas in which they are 
directed to operate, and activities that are forbidden.  Organizations 
interpret mandates into their own terms.  This is especially true when the 
broad goals conflict or offer little operational guidance.  Morton Halperin 
thus adds the concept of organizational essence, defined as “the view held 
by the dominant group in the organization of what the missions and 
capabilities should be.15 
 
The United Nations’ Charter defines the purposes for which the organization was created, 
but did not explicitly lay out how peace interventions should be designed.  Thus, with the 
expansion of traditional peace operations following the end of the Cold War, 2nd 
generation peacekeeping operations were being given increasingly ambitious mandates 
with UN leading officials interpreting the UN Charter as they saw fit at the time.  The 
broad goals following the end of the Cold War were to become more involved in the 
emerging conflicts around the world coupled with the optimism for increased cooperation 
following the end of the Cold War.  These goals were not matched with a set design for 
these increasingly ambitious interventions, thus setting the stage for the string of failed 
interventions in the 1990s.  
Third, particularly relevant to this analysis is the author’s discussion of the 
potential for “dangerous dysfunctionality,” referring to the damaging results that occur 
when an organization attempts to superimpose new, unfamiliar tasks onto old, previously 
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established routines.16  The result, they argue, is that “the interactions defy ready 
understanding and can magnify the consequences of small failures, which are 
inevitable.”17  This helps to explain the failure particularly of the attempted humanitarian 
operations that took place in Somalia and Bosnia, in which the foundational tenants of 
traditional peacekeeping were adapted in order to allow for UN interventions in 
increasingly complicated conflicts in which consent and/or impartiality of the intervening 
troops were not present.  
 Fourth, Allison and Zelikow outline the reality that an organization’s reliance on 
standard operating procedures necessarily inhibits an organization’s ability to change.  
Thus, in terms of the actual implementation and execution of peace operations, the 
central coordination and control of the United Nations translates into the implementation 
of an operation reflecting previously established routines.18  In this sense, while standard 
operating procedures are useful in their ability to streamline the every day operations 
within an organization, as Allison and Zelikow state, “this regularized capacity for 
adequate performance is purchased at the price of standardization […] Specific instances, 
particularly critical instances that typically do not have “standard” characteristics, are 
often handled sluggishly or inappropriately.”19  In addition, standard operating 
procedures are rarely designed for the specific situation in which they are executed, and 
thus the resulting operation, although most appropriate for the required scenario, is not 
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necessarily the best to begin with.20  Unfortunately, standard operating procedures are 
ingrained within the structure of an organization, and thus attempts to change these 
routines can be difficult.  This particular reliance and dependency on standard operation 
procedures also helps to explain why the United Nations is having difficulty 
implementing the Brahimi Report recommendations.  As Allison and Zelikow state, “the 
deeper the grounding, the more resistant SOPs are to change.”21  
Fifth, and most relevant in terms of the United Nations’ failure to successfully 
implement specific recommendations as made in the Brahimi Report, is an organization’s 
inability to engage in “directed change.”22  Allison and Zelikow highlight the fact that, 
“Major lines of organizational action are straight – i.e., behavior at one time, t, is 
marginally different from behavior at t-1. Straightforward predictions are a good bet: 
behavior at t +1 will be marginally different from behavior at the present time.”23  This 
limited flexibility in regards to an organization’s ability to change is due to the fact that : 
a) organizational budgets change incrementally; b) organizational culture, priorities, and 
perceptions are relatively stable; c) organizational procedures and repertoires change 
incrementally; d) New activities typically consist of marginal adaptations of existing 
programs and activities; and lastly e) a program, once undertaken, is not dropped at the 
point where objective costs outweigh benefits.24  This does not mean that an organization 
is forever unable to change, however it does indicate that attempts at reform must be 
                                                
20 Ibid., 179. 
21 Ibid., 170. 
22 Ibid., 180. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
 56 
carefully targeted towards specific factors that support particular routines in order to 
effect major changes over time.25   
Thus, the ability or inability of the UN to implement particular Brahimi Report 
recommendations was greatly influenced by the types of reform advocated by the 
Brahimi Report Panel.  In correspondence with the above hypotheses we should therefore 
expect to see: H1) recommendations that directly involved large changes in funding 
structures receive low scores on the Stimson Report’s implementation scale; H2) the 
greater the number of subdivisions involved in the reform, the less likely that the reform 
was to have been successfully implemented due to the fact that the culture, priorities, and 
perceptions of each targeted subdivision were required to adapt to the reform in order for 
the implementation to be successful; H3) incremental organizational changes, for 
examples changes requiring more money or technology, receive higher implementation 
scores than whole scale organizational changes, whereas recommendations focusing on 
whole scale organizational changes, which targeted major factors that support routines, 
such as personnel changes, rewards, information, or budgetary requirements, should be 
much more difficult to implement;26 and H4) recommendations requiring implementation 
mainly on behalf of Member States receive much lower implementation scores, as the 
ability of Member States to develop new activities should be heavily impacted by their 
varying capabilities and willingness to build upon the uneven levels of organization that 
already existed between and amongst Member States.  
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The recommendations as made by the Panel of the Brahimi Report will be 
categorized under the aforementioned hypothesis regarding an organizations ability to 
engage in directed change in the next chapter to explain why certain recommendations 
received higher implementation scores as graded by the Stimson Report than others.  
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CHAPTER 5: FROM RECOMMENDATION TO IMPLEMENTATION 
The Stimson Report utilized a numbered system to assess the United Nations’ 
progress in the implementation of the Brahimi Report recommendations.  The 
implementation scale ranged from zero to five, with zero indicating a complete failure of 
the UN to implement the recommendation, and five indicating that the UN’s compliance 
efforts exceeded the Brahimi Report’s recommendation.   
Implementation Scoring Criteria1 
Score Definition Score Definition 
0 Recommendation 
unimplemented. 
3 Partly implemented 
(partial funding; partial 
staff; reduced concept).  
1 Proposed by Secretariat; 
rejected by 
intergovernmental bodies. 
4 Implemented, with 
capacity equivalent to 
Report recommendation. 
2 Proposed by Secretariat; 
action deferred by 
intergovernmental bodies 
or is mission-specific and 
awaits application. 
5 Implementation exceeds 
Report recommendation. 
   
The chart scores, as broken down within the Stimson analysis, reflect the level of 
implementation for each recommendation as based upon the evaluation of each of the 
implementing actors’ actions, averaging their performance.2  The Stimson Report thus 
analyzes each of the original Brahimi Report recommendations to see which 
recommendations applied to each individual department within the United Nations, with 
                                                
1 From Durch et al., "The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations," 117. 
2 Ibid. 
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responsibilities for implementation falling to the Secretary-General, General Assembly 
administrative approval, Security Council cooperation, General Assembly regular budget, 
General Assembly and Peacekeeping budgets, other UN Agencies, Security Council 
mandates, or UN and State implementation, with any possible combination of the 
aforementioned divisions.   
Within the Stimson Report, the recommendations were broken down into eighty-
one categories, with each given an implementation score.  Of the eighty-one graded 
recommendations, the easier the recommendation was to implement, the higher the 
probability that the Brahimi Report recommendation was implemented; the harder the 
recommendation to implement, the less likely it was to be implemented. What exactly 
constitutes “easy” or “hard to implement,” of course, varied across the recommendations, 
with the applicable definitions getting at the core of the issue here; that is, the limitations 
of the United Nations, when examined organizationally.  With the definitions of “easy” 
and “hard” to follow through further examination, it will suffice to say simply that in 
terms of the overall implementation of the Brahimi Report recommendations, ease of 
implementation was one of the overriding influential factors regarding the United 
Nation’s implementation compliance, with one exception clause: in cases where the 
recommendation was so important, despite the difficulties involved, the addressed issue 
was reformed.  
This section looks at certain “easy to implement” recommendations that contained 
key words such as “encourage” and “endorse.”  This includes, for example, Brahimi 
Report recommendation 1a, which involved the Secretary-General’s endorsement of 
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conflict prevention plans, and 1b, requiring the encouragement of Secretary-General fact-
finding missions as listed in the table below.  
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2.1 1a 
Endorsement of Secretary 
General’s (S-G’s) conflict 
prevention plans 
X … … … … … … … … 4.0 
2.1 1b Encourage S-G fact-finding missions X … … … … … … … … 4.0 
 
 These recommendations received high implementation grades due to the fact that 
little hard action was needed to fulfill the recommendations’ requirement, and instead a 
particular department was simply required to support or encourage a particular course of 
action.  Both recommendations received a 4.0 on the implementation scale, indicating full 
compliance. In the case of recommendation 1a, it is stated within the Brahimi Report that 
the reporting panel wished to commend the United Nations’ ongoing internal Task Force 
on Peace and Security for its work in the area of long-term prevention.3 No 
recommendation was actually made; rather, the work of the Task Force was simply 
commended and encouraged to continue.  Recommendation 1b, in turn, was addressed 
primarily towards Member States because the recommendation, though explicitly 
supportive of the Secretary-General’s fact-finding missions in areas of concern, was 
meant to stress Member States’ obligations under the UN Charter to give “every 
                                                
3 Lakhdar Brahimi, "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,"  (2000), 5. 
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assistance” to such activities.  Given the standards required in the scoring criteria, it is 
easy to see how these were graded accordingly.4  
Hypothesis One: Funding 
In regards to recommendations that directly involved funding changes, as Allison 
and Zelikow state, “Organizational budgets change incrementally, both with respect to 
totals and with respect to intra-organizational splits.”5 This section will analyze funding 
recommendations 14b, 14s1, and 2c as listed in the table below.   
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6.3 14b 
Treat Headquarters 
peacekeeping support as 
core activity and shift to 
funding to regular budget 
… … … X X … … … … 0.0 
3.34 14s1 
Set 5-year moving 
average as baseline cost of 
doing peacekeeping, add a 
percentage surcharge to 
average mission costs for 
Headquarters support 
… X … X … … … … … 0.0 
2.52 2c 
Put disarmament, 
demobilization, and 
reintegration (DDR) 
funding in 1st phase of 
assessed mission budgets 
… … … … X … … … … 2.0 
 
The United Nation’s compliance with regards to recommendations that involved 
funding changes fit this observation.  For example, Brahimi Report recommendation 14b 
urged Headquarters peacekeeping support to be treated as a core activity and to shift 
funding to the regular budget. This recommendation was premised upon the belief that 
                                                
4 Ibid., 6. 
5 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 180. 
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peacekeeping should no longer be treated as a temporary requirement and the DPKO as a 
temporary organizational structure; rather, in order to be successful, peacekeeping 
activities required a “consistent and predictable baseline of funding to do more than keep 
existing missions afloat.”6 The Brahimi Report thus recommended that with the shift of 
peacekeeping to be treated as a core activity of the United Nations, the majority of the 
resource requirements should consequently be funded through the mechanism of the 
regular biennial programme budget of the UN.7 As the Stimson Report points out, this 
particular aspect of the recommendation become a sensitive issue when taken in the 
context of the “no-growth” politics surrounding the regular budget.8 This 
recommendation, which involved the General Assembly regular budget, the General 
Assembly, and peacekeeping budgets, received a 0.0 on the implementation scale.  
Brahimi Report recommendation 14s1 advocated for setting a 5-year moving 
average as a baseline cost for performing peacekeeping activities, and then adding a 
percentage surcharge to average mission costs for Headquarters support.  This funding 
recommendation, which involved General Assembly administrative approval and the 
General Assembly budget, also received a 0.0 on the implementation scale.  
Recommendation 2c advocates putting disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration (DDR) funding in 1st phase assessments of mission budgets in order to 
address the difficulties previously encountered with the voluntary funding used to support 
reintegration efforts.  The Brahimi Report highlights the importance of reintegration 
                                                
6 Brahimi, "Brahimi Report," 33. 
7 Ibid., 34. 
8 Durch et al., "The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations," 62. 
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activities in halting the repetitive nature of the conflict cycle by outlining the importance 
of giving previous combatants alternate opportunities to pursue in society.  The Report 
acknowledges the difficulties that the UN has experienced, however, in regards to the 
dozens of UN agencies and programs, as well as the international and local NGOs who 
fund these reintegration programs.9 With funding coming from so many different sources, 
there is no central coordination point within the UN designed to handle contributions.  Up 
until the fall of 2003, however, DDR funding remained voluntary, lacking any official 
assessments regarding reintegration activities.  The recommendation, which demanded 
changes in both General assembly and peacekeeping budgets, thus received a 2.0 on the 
implementation scale.   
Hypothesis Two: Number of Involved Subdivisions 
 Another factor influencing the ease in which recommendations were successfully 
implemented involves the number of subdivisions involved.  As Allison and Zelikow 
state, “organizational culture, priorities, and perceptions are relatively stable.”10 In other 
words, the greater the number of subdivisions involved in the reform, the less likely the 
reform was successfully implemented, due to the fact that the culture, priorities, and 
perceptions of each targeted subdivision were required to adapt to the reform in order for 
the implementation to be successful; the fewer subdivisions involved, the easier.   
For example, recommendations in which only the Secretary-General was involved 
often received high implementation scores.  This would be due to the fact that with the 
involvement of only one subdivision, only one particular department of the United 
                                                
9 Brahimi, "Brahimi Report," 8. 
10 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 180. 
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Nations was required to adapt and make efforts towards seeing the recommendation 
through to implementation. This includes recommendations: 
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2.1 1a 
Endorsement of 
Secretary-General’s 
conflict prevention plans 
X … … … … … … … … 4.0 
2.1 1b 
Encourage Secretary-
General fact-finding 
missions 
X … … … … … … … … 4.0 
2.2 2d 
Peacebuilding strategy 
should be developed by 
the Executive Committee 
on Peace and Security 
X … … … … … … … … 3.5 
3.2 14s2 
Coordinate and integrate 
planning and training 
activities in DPKO 
X … … … … … … … … 4.5 
3.314 16s2 Designate a principal ASG X … … … … … … … … 4.0 
3.323 16s3 Rationalize tasks across departments X … … … … … … … … 3.0 
- 18c 
Use UN Office for 
Project Services 
(UNOPS) for smaller, 
non-military field 
missions 
X … … … … … … … … 3.0 
- 21s1 
Appoint senior official to 
oversee implementation 
of these 
recommendations 
X … … … … … … … … 4.0 
3.33 22s1 
UN management culture 
has to change if reform 
efforts are not to be 
wasted 
X … … … … … … … … 3.0 
 
Hypothesis Three: Incremental Organizational Changes 
As Allison and Zelikow highlight in Essence of Decision, organizational procedures and 
repertoires change incrementally.11 As demonstrated by the Stimson Report’s grading 
system regarding recommendation compliance, incremental organizational changes—for 
                                                
11 Ibid. 
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example, changes requiring more money or technology—were easier to implement than 
whole scale organizational changes, which were much more difficult.  Particularly 
relevant to this section are Brahimi Report recommendations 2a, 20b, 20c, 20e, and 2b as 
shown in the table below.   
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2.51 2a 
Quick impact projects 
(QIPs) funding in 1st year 
mission budgets 
… … … … X … X … … 4.0 
3.132 20b 
EISAS and Information 
Technology and Services 
Division (ITSD) should 
enhance peace operations 
on the intranet/extranet 
… … … X … … … … … 3.5 
3.133 20c 
Use more geographic 
information systems (GIS) 
technology 
… X … X X … … … … 4.0 
3.13 20e 
Headquarters and missions 
should co-manage a 
website 
X … … X X … … … … 4.0 
2.53 2b 
Need doctrinal shift in use 
of Rule of Law and 
Human Rights mission 
elements 
… … … … … X X X … 2.0 
 
Brahimi Report recommendation 2a stressed the importance of cooperating and 
working with looking local parties on the ground in order to make a “demonstrable 
difference in the lives of the people in their mission area, relatively early in the life of the 
mission.”12 This recommendation, which required quick impact project funding in first 
year mission budgets, involved the General assembly and peacekeeping budgets as well 
as Security Council mandate, and was easily implemented, receiving a 4.0 on the 
implementation scale.  
                                                
12 Brahimi, "Brahimi Report," 7. 
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Recommendation 20b was a technological improvement that focused on the need 
to enhance peace operations on the intranet/extranet.  The Brahimi Report focused on the 
invaluable addition a synchronized information network would be to peacekeeping 
planning, management, and execution activities by drawing together EISAS analyses, 
situation reports, geographic information systems (GIS) maps, and linkages to lessons 
learned.13 Current major changes to the UN’s Integrated Management Information 
System (IMIS) include new database architecture and a re-engineered user interface with 
Web-based access, which will remedy the system by providing 24-hour, web-based 
access to IMIS for UN missions and support offices.14 Though these changes are part of a 
major re-engineering process that began in the 80s, the changes made have sufficiently 
conformed to Brahimi Report recommendations and received a 3.5 on the implementation 
scale.  
Recommendation 20c was another technological improvement that stressed the 
need to use more GIS technology.  The Brahimi Report recognized the wealth of 
untapped information regional actors, such as UN country teams, and grass-roots level 
groups, such as NGOs, have that could prove to be extremely valuable to incoming peace 
operations.  The panel advocated the use of an electronic clearing house, therefore, 
managed by EISAS to share this data and to assist in mission planning and execution 
activities.15 Despite smaller disagreements regarding specific staffing and restructuring 
concerns, the Secretariat and UN inter-governmental bodies were extremely enthusiastic 
                                                
13 Ibid., 43. 
14 Durch et al., "The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations," 44. 
15 Brahimi, "Brahimi Report," 43. 
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towards this recommendation, General Assembly administrative approval, General 
Assembly regular budget, and General Assembly and Peacekeeping budget departments 
receiving a 4.0 on the implementation scale.16  
Recommendation 20a addressed the UN’s need for a broader technological reform 
regarding IT and logistics support of peace operation activities by recommending that 
headquarters get a responsibility center for information technology strategy and training, 
with mission counterparts.  The Report recommended that a headquarters-based 
responsibility center with a chief information officer (CIO) be created to supervise the 
development and implementation of IT strategy and user standards.17  The DPKO has 
taken up this recommendation with its new director of change management serving as the 
chief information officer for the department.18  Full implementation has yet to be 
achieved, however, due to varying results within the IT responsibility centers within each 
field mission.  Each operation, though equipped with an electronics and communications 
technical staff, does not have the high-level direction as envisioned by the Brahimi 
Report to guide further IT applications.19 The recommendation has thus received a 3.0 for 
its partial implementation on the grading scale.  
Recommendation 20e was recommendation based on the need to improve the 
timeliness of internet-based public information by creating a website co-managed by 
headquarters and field missions.  Headquarters, it was planned, would maintain oversight 
                                                
16 Durch et al., "The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations," 45. 
17 Ibid., 42. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 43. 
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but individual missions would have staff authorized to produce and post web content.20 
Co-management of mission websites by headquarters and field missions has since been 
implemented, the recommendation receiving a 4.0 on the implementation scale.  
Brahimi Report recommendation 2b, in contrast, required a doctrinal shift in the 
use of Rule of Law and Human Rights mission elements.  This recommendation 
represented a whole scale change, and attempted to address the problem with UN 
operations in the 1990s in which CivPol was deployed as a sort of police force in 
situations in which other elements of the “rule of law” such as laws, courts, jails, and law 
officials, were not in place.  As the Stimson Report states, “The Brahimi Report spoke to 
this reluctance to commit to the complete rule of law package in its call for the concerted 
teaming of police, judicial, legal, and human rights experts in future complex peace 
operations, which would amount to a ‘doctrinal shift’ in the way in which rule of law was 
pursued in such operations.”21 This recommendation required a Security Council 
mandate, the cooperation of other UN agencies, as well as implementation by the UN and 
Member States.  Steps have been taken in the right direction, though full compliance has 
remained illusory, the recommendation consequently receiving a 2.0 on the 
implementation scale.  
Hypothesis Four: Member State Implementation 
As Allison and Zelikow state, “New activities typically consist of marginal 
adaptations of existing programs and activities.”22 Recommendations that involved 
                                                
20 Brahimi, "Brahimi Report," 44. 
21 Durch et al., "The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations," 29. 
22 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 180. 
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member state responsibility for reforms often received low to intermediary 
implementation scores due largely to the fact that the ability of Member States to develop 
new activities were heavily impacted by their varying capabilities and willingness to 
build upon the uneven levels of organization that each particular member state has in its 
capacity. This section will focus on recommendations 10a, 10b, 10c, 10d, 9a, and 22s5 as 
shown in the graph below.   
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4.5 10a 
Member States should 
establish national pools of 
civilian police (Civpol) for 
UN deployments 
… … … … … … … X X 2.0 
4.5 10b Member States should train regionally for Civpol … … … … … … … … X 2.0 
4.5 10c 
Member States should 
designate single point of 
contact for Civpol 
… … … … … … … … X 3.0 
4.5 10d Create Civpol on-call list … … … … … … … X X 2.5 
4.5 9a 
Member States should 
form brigade-size 
multinational forces for 
peacekeeping 
… … … … … … … X X 2.5 
- 22s5 
Hope Member States can 
resolve Security Council 
representation issue 
… … … … … … … … X 0.0 
 
For example, recommendations involving improved recruitment and deployment 
of capable police and other criminal justice personnel received partial implementation 
scores ranging from 2.0-3.0, most likely due to the fact that better qualified personnel 
requires synchronized training procedures and recruitment mechanisms, both of which 
entail lengthy reform procedures that are still in process. Brahimi Report 
recommendations 10a, 10b, 10c, and 10d, all involve the improved recruitment and 
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deployment of CivPol personnel, with responsibility falling to Member States’ 
implementation.  The Brahimi Report placed a special emphasis on the importance of 
capable civilian police due to the important roles they play in UN peace interventions.  
The Brahimi Report states, “Civilian police are second only to military forces in numbers 
of international personnel involved in United Nations peacekeeping operations…The 
fairness and impartiality of the local police force, which civilian police monitor and train, 
is crucial to maintaining a safe and secure environment, and its effectiveness is vital 
where intimidation and criminal networks continue to obstruct progress on the political 
and economic fronts.”23   
Recommendation 10a encouraged states to establish a national pool of civilian 
police officers that would be ready for deployment to UN peace operations on short 
notice; 10b encouraged Member States to train regionally for Civpol according to UN 
training standards; 10c encouraged Member States to designate single points of contact 
for Civpol; and 10d encouraged the creation of Civpol on-call lists.  As the Stimson 
analysis points out, while some Member States are committed to improving UN capacity 
for more capable Civpol teams, too few states have made any significant progress moving 
towards training programs or establishing national pools of candidates for international 
operations.24 In addition, recommendation 10c, which called for a single point of contact 
for CivPol, caused immediate bureaucratic reactions from some permanent missions to 
the UN, who argued that they already served as focal points for police requests.25 A more 
                                                
23 Brahimi, "Brahimi Report," 20. 
24 Durch et al., "The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations," 80. 
25 Ibid., 81. 
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fundamental problem includes the continued quality of personnel who apply for CivPol 
positions, with many failing to meet the UN’s basic standards.  And although the UN 
Secretariat has attempted to draft standardized CivPol rules and training procedures, their 
efforts have been hampered by a lack of member state feedback.26   
 Recommendation 9a encouraged states to form brigade-size multinational forces 
for peacekeeping, emphasizing the importance of having a readily-available military 
force of the United Nations comprised of a group of countries working together to 
develop common training and equipment standards, common doctrine, and common 
arrangements for the operational control of the force.27 The formation of several of these 
brigades, it was thought, would enable full deployment to an operation within 30 days for 
traditional peacekeeping missions, and 90 days for complex operations.28 This 
recommendation, which involved member state compliance, received a 2.5 or partial 
implementation score, due primarily to the fact that while Member States seem 
supportive of the idea, no state has stepped forward offering to form such forces.   
 Recommendation 22s5 of the Brahimi Report is a more general, idealistic 
recommendation that seems only to have been thrown in for good measure, and hopes 
that Member States can resolve Security Council representation issues. The Brahimi 
Report recognizes the fact that there are issues, such as this particular recommendation, 
which are critical to the success of UN peace operations that can only be addressed by 
UN Member States’ cooperation and efforts to work together. Given the difficulty of 
                                                
26 Ibid., 80. 
27 Brahimi, "Brahimi Report," 19. 
28 Ibid. 
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resolving Security Council issues in general, this recommendation unfortunately, though 
predictably, received a 0.0 on the implementation scale.  
Exception Clause 
In terms of the exception clause, there were several cases in which the 
recommendation was considered so important, that despite the difficulties involved 
(regarding the type of organizational change involved, the number of involved 
subdivisions, member state implementation, or funding) the addressed issue was 
reformed.  This includes recommendations 3a, 3s1, 7a, and 24s1 as listed in the table 
below.  
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2.41 3a 
Peacekeeping Doctrine 
and Strategy must include 
self-defense, robust rules 
of engagement (ROE) 
… … X … … … X X … 3.5 
2.41 3s1 ROE must be clear and robust X … … … … … X X … 3.0 
4.1 7a 
Defining deployment 
timelines of 30/90 days 
for peace operations 
… X X … X … … X X 3.5 
4.4 24s1 Addressing HIV/AIDS X … X … … X … X … 4.5 
 
Brahimi Report recommendation 3a required that Peacekeeping Doctrine and 
Strategy include robust rules of engagement and self-defense.  As outlined within the 
Brahimi Report, it was a fundamental premise of the report that the United Nations be 
able to respond effectively to operational challenges presented that concerned the consent 
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of involved local parties, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defense.29  The 
report highlighted the absolute need for UN troops to be able to carry out their mandate 
“professionally and successfully,”30 stating explicitly that troops must be therefore be 
capable of “defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate 
with robust rules of engagement.”31  Despite the fact that this recommendation involved 
Security Council cooperation, a Security Council mandate, as well as implementation on 
behalf of UN and Member States, it was aggressively pursued and successfully reformed, 
receiving a 3.5 on the implementation scale.  The related recommendation 3s1 involved 
clear and robust rules of engagement, also received a 3.0 on the implementation scale 
despite requiring cooperation on behalf of the Secretary-General, a Security Council 
mandate, as well as UN and Member States implementation, demonstrating how 
important these recommendations were considered to be to the success of peacekeeping 
initiatives.   
Brahimi Report recommendation 7a defined deployment timelines of 30-90 days 
for peace operations, and involved the General Assembly, administrative approval, 
Security Council cooperation, GA and PK budgets, as well as UN and Member States 
implementation.  This recommendation received a 3.5 on the implementation scale.  As 
the Stimson analysis points out, prior to the Brahimi Report, standard procedures 
outlining the timely deployment of UN operations did not exist.   It was well known 
among UN officials, however, that the first six-twelve weeks following the signing of a 
                                                
29 Ibid., 9. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 10. 
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peace accord were the most crucial in determining an operation’s local credibility.32 
Despite the fact that this particular recommendation required substantial changes in the 
way that Member States and the UN in general prepared for mission deployments, it 
received a 3.5 on the implementation scale, demonstrating the recognition among 
Member States as to how crucial this particular aspect of peacekeeping operations is.  
Another recommendation which received a high score on the implementation 
scale despite the difficulties involved in addressing the issue was Brahimi Report 
recommendation 24s1, addressing HIV/AIDs. The Brahimi Report pointed out the 
fundamental importance of HIV/AIDS education and control as an essential component 
of an effective peace-building process.33 This recommendation involved the Secretary-
General, Security Council cooperation, other UN agencies, and UN and States 
implementation and fell under the umbrella of the need to recruit and deploy capable 
military forces.  Despite the numbers of subdivisions involved, this recommendation 
received a 4.5 on the implementation scale, the highest implementation score that any of 
the eighty-one recommendations as graded by the Stimson Report received.  
Thus, in analyzing the Stimson Center’s grading of UN compliance with Brahimi 
Report recommendations, the perspective of organizational theory as outlined in the four 
hypotheses as explored above, gives some insight into the “how” and “why” aspects of 
the UN’s implementation patterns.  That is to say that in this section, the degree of 
success in regards to the UN’s implementation of certain Brahimi Report 
recommendations could be explained, in part, by using a framework analyzing the 
                                                
32 Durch et al., "The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations," 64. 
33 Brahimi, "Brahimi Report," 3. 
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behavior of organizations in general, and then applying that framework to the United 
Nations in particular.  Certain recommendations were much easier to implement and thus 
received much higher implementation levels due to the fact that organizationally, the UN 
was able to respond to the demands at hand.  Other recommendations were much more 
difficult due to the fact that these recommendations required more interdivisional 
cooperation, dramatic funding changes, or involved sweeping reforms that structurally 
would take time for any organization, particularly the UN which is composed of 192 
Member States.    
Thus, the organizational theory propositions and hypotheses which were used in 
this section to explain the UN’s compliance with particular Brahimi Report 
recommendations as analyzed by the Stimson Center, could also have been used to 
predict the UN’s ability to successfully implement certain Brahimi Report 
recommendations upon examination of the components of the original recommendations.  
Recommendations most suited to fit typical organizational patterns of change would be 
predicted to receive the highest implementation scores, with other recommendations 
predicted to receive much lower scores as dependent upon the degree to which the 
targeted reform goes against typical organizational behavioral patterns.  
 76 
 
CHAPTER 6: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
Clearly, analyses regarding the UN’s successes and failures in peace operations 
are not hard to come by.  The publicized failures of major UN operations in the 1990s 
following the end of the Cold War sparked numerous debates regarding the future 
feasibility of the United Nations as the world rushed into the 21st century.  While some 
scholars are optimistic, much of the current literature that exists, though reinforcing the 
importance of the existence of an international institution such as the United Nations, 
recognize not only the organization’s ultimate failures in peace operations, but also its 
futility in the face of the world’s major power, the United States.  The United Nations, 
some even go so far to argue, as a capable, functioning organization has become obsolete.  
That last conclusion, however, is unwarranted. Without diving into arguments 
regarding the importance of ideas such as world cooperation and international order that 
an organization like the United Nations represents, it is absolutely fundamental to 
recognize that the United Nations is capable of change, as demonstrated by its ability to 
comply with certain Brahimi Report recommendations.  The United Nations, however, is 
resistant to change, due to the structure of the organization.  This does not mean, 
however, that is fundamentally unable to do so.   
Resistance to Change 
 As highlighted in chapter four of this study, organizations are resistant to change.  
Allison and Zelikow’s second proposition focuses on the fact that an organization’s 
reliance on standard operating procedures necessarily inhibits its ability to change.  Their 
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fifth proposition also specifically addresses an organization’s inability to engage in 
“directed change” due to the fact that, among other things, organizational budgets change 
incrementally, organizational culture, priorities, and perceptions are relatively stable, and 
organizational procedures and repertoires change incrementally.1  Looking at the United 
Nations simply as an organizational entity, therefore, it is evident that the UN faces 
obstacles in reform simply due to the functional, structural, and bureaucratic nature of its 
operations.  
 Attempts at reform within the United Nations specifically, however, are further 
compounded by several aspects of the structure of the organization itself.  There are 
reasons why the UN functions the way that it does today, including the seemingly 
complex and inefficient methods by which it operates.  The United Nations and all the 
subdivisions, departments, and positions that currently exist within the organization are a 
result of specific structure designs that were produced following the creation of the UN, 
or that have evolved from previous setups.  That is to say, there are individuals and 
groups that benefit from the way the UN is currently structured, and are therefore 
resistant to change. Resistance to change within the United Nations, be it on behalf of 
individuals, departments, or Member States, is a huge obstacle to change, further 
compounding the obstacles to reform that the UN faces simply as an organization.  
Specifically in regards to peace operations, as Jett states in Why Peacekeeping Fails, 
“Even though reform might improve the chances for peacekeeping to succeed, the status 
quo serves someone’s interest and that someone will see change as detrimental to those 
                                                
1 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 180-2. 
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interests.  Protectors of the status quo can include the member states of the UN, the UN 
bureaucracy, or NGOs.”2  
 This does not mean, however, that the UN is fundamentally unable to change.  
What it does mean, however, is that attempts at reform must be able to circumvent these 
obstacles through targeted, direct action or must framed in a way that the reform becomes 
uniquely important for all involved divisions and Member States.  For example, the 
Brahimi Report recommendations which received the highest implementation ratings 
were those incremental organizational reforms that targeted specific aspects of 
peacekeeping operations, such as technological improvements enhancing peace 
operations on the intranet/extranet, improving GIS technology, and enhancing general IT 
and logistics support of peace operation activities.  Other recommendations, such as the 
need to address HIV/AIDs in peacekeeping activities, the need for robust rules of 
engagement and self-defense, and the need for defined deployment timelines of 30-90 
days, were reforms which involved the cooperation of all Member States and select 
subdivisions and should have been much more difficult to implement.  However, these 
issues were important to Member States and the involved subdivisions, and were thus 
addressed and successfully reformed nonetheless.  Future reforms must also be framed in 
a way that specifically grasps the attention of the groups/members involved in the reform, 
making the issue as pertinent and sensitive to them as it is for the success of peace 
operations of the UN in general.  Framing the issues in a way that necessitates immediate 
action will jumpstart movements toward reform and should help to squash opposition.   
                                                
2 Jett, Why Peacekeeping Fails, 170. 
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Though these are admittedly small improvements, they represent the success of targeted 
reform attempts nonetheless.  Small steps can add up to giant leaps in the end.   
 There is also a dangerous aspect to large sweeping reforms that attempt to change 
the UN radically and quickly.  One aspect of reform that almost never gets addressed in 
debates is the danger that if you take something apart in order to fix it, (i.e., the United 
Nations), you may never be able to put the organization back together, left in the end with 
broken parts and a “whole” that never works again.  In regards to the United Nations, 
once people start throwing into question the hard-won elements of consensus that 
provides the foundational basis for the international organization, there will be systemic 
or ripple effects where other relationships and aspects of the organization are 
compromised.  
Peace Enforcement Activities 
In regards to peace interventions, the United Nations is best suited to perform 
traditional peacekeeping activities.  In terms of the planning, logistics, and rapid reaction 
capabilities of the United Nations in peace enforcement operations as executed under 
Chapter VII mandates of the UN Charter, the United Nations has been unable to 
demonstrate its ability to design and execute these highly complex, combat heavy 
military operations.  Jett, for example, cites other scholars who argue this point: “Our 
central contention is that the lack of functional political-military machinery within the 
UN, to assist in framing of resolutions under Chapters VI or VII and to manage any 
military aspects of their implementation and control, is a fundamental institutional gap 
 80 
that must be filled if the use of collectively sanctioned military measures is to be 
effective.3  
This does not mean, however, that the UN must avoid or turn its back on 
situations which demand coercive military forces to save lives and bring security to a 
specific region.  It does mean, however, that until the UN is successfully able to 
implement the majority of all Brahimi Report recommendations to a satisfactory degree, 
the UN simply is not ready to handle these types of operations.  This entails either 
increased efforts at re-framing reform issues that previously failed in order to capture the 
urgent attention of involved Member States and subdivisions in an attempt to implement 
all suggested reforms, or subcontracting out to privatized security forces or Member 
States (such as the US-led coalition force, UNITAF) that are capable of handling the 
situation both logistically, politically, and militarily.   
Standing UN force 
 The creation of a standing, rapid reaction UN force as originally outlined in the 
UN Charter, a solution advocated by some, would not solve all of the UN’s 
organizational failings in regards to complex peace interventions requiring the ability and 
will to use coercive force.  A standing UN force would help to rectify the UN’s current 
problems regarding the need for military forces with similar equipment, training, 
doctrine, and operational methods.  However, even if such a force were to be created, a 
possibility that seems highly unlikely due to Member States’ refusal (particularly the 
United States) to place domestic forces under foreign command, existing problems 
                                                
3 Whitman and Bartholomew in Ibid., 54. 
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regarding Member States’ agreement as to where such forces would be placed, and the 
particular mandates to which these forces would operate under, would remain unresolved.  
In addition, a standing UN force would still be subject to the command and control 
structures of the United Nations, which, as illustrated throughout this study, remain 
ineffective as they currently exist in their capacities to run complex, combat-heavy 
military operations.   
And though the Brahimi Report advocates the strengthening of the United Nations 
Stand-by Arrangement Systems (UNSAS) which is based on conditional commitments 
(military formations, specialized personnel, services, and/or material and equipment) by 
Member States within the agreed response times for UN operations, these stand-by forces 
are used exclusively for peacekeeping operations as mandated by the Security Council.4  
Thus, although reinforcing Member States’ contributions of these stand-by forces is 
important in order to maintain the UN’s ability to rapidly deploy troops for new 
peacekeeping missions or to reinforce existing ones, the reinforcement of the UNSAS 
would not help to solve the UN’s problems vis-à-vis more militarily complex, combat-
heavy peace interventions.  
Member State Attitudes 
 Above all, the attitudes of Member States must change.  The United Nations is 
both a bureaucracy and an organization predicated upon the cooperation and commitment 
of all 192 involved Member States.  As a UN Press Release SC/6261 of August 30, 1996 
                                                
4 United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) (Department of Peacekeeping Operations April 
30, 2005 2005 [cited April 2007]); available from 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/milad/fgs2/unsas_files/sba.htm. 
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stated, “Improving the efficiency of the bureaucracy will amount to little if it is not 
accompanied by changes in the actions of the member states, including what they ask of 
the organization.  Some are skeptical that changes can be made.”5  These skeptical 
attitudes fundamentally hinder the organization’s efforts towards reform.  After all, an 
organization is composed of parts, and it is impossible for the whole organization to 
reform if the parts are unwilling to try.   The press release continued, in regards to peace 
operations specifically, “No amount of tinkering with procedures and machinery is 
enough.  Only agreement on the scope of UN operations and commitment by member 
states to support them politically with feasible mandates and financially with the 
resources necessary will allow the UN to respond effectively to future distress calls.”6  It 
is thus quite fitting that one of the most important and basic elements enabling any 
possible reform in the future relies on the very components for which the organization 
was created, the peace and stability of the international order as facilitated through the 
actions of Member States.   
 
 
 
 
                                                
5 UN Press Release SC/6261 in Jett, Why Peacekeeping Fails, 170. 
6 UN Press Release SC/6261 in Ibid., 173. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 There are many views regarding the utility of the United Nations and the 
feasibility that this international organization has in regards to the maintenance of 
international peace and security as the world progresses into the 21st century.  Some 
views though cynical, represent a familiar refrain, arguing that the UN only works when 
you do not need it to, and never works when you do.  Other views are more idealistic, 
perceiving the UN as a transcendent vehicle for human betterment, believing that the 
organization represents the fulfillment of human aspirations and the voice of the 
conscience of the world. More pragmatic views tend to argue that the UN has become 
indispensable before it has really become effective. More extreme and arguably paranoid 
views perceive the United Nations as an outside actor that threatens the sovereignty of 
states’ internal affairs, perceiving UN actions towards reform as attempts towards 
establishing the organization as the central authority in international affairs.   
 A common thread throughout many of these views of the United Nations is the 
idea that the UN is an independent actor that has the capability of acting on its own.  This 
is simply, however, not the case.  It is absolutely fundamental to remember that the 
United Nations is a vehicle, funded and driven mostly by Member States, and particularly 
the United States.  As such, attempts towards reform must be geared towards this setup, 
must understand the difficulties organizations face in general towards reform attempts, 
and adapt accordingly.  After all, the purpose of organizational institutions is to provide 
stability over time, a structure that will stay unchanged as conditions change.  Reforms 
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must thus compensate for this inherent resistance to change in order to better the 
organization as a whole, particularly in regard to peace operation activities.  It is here that 
the relevance of this particular study comes in.  
 This study explored the primary question which had been raised following the 
publicized failures of the major UN peace interventions undertaken in the 1990s, mainly 
whether or not the UN will be able to adequately reform the design and practice of the 
organization’s peace intervention activities in order to take into account the UN’s 
inherent military organizational weaknesses.  With the release of the Brahimi Report in 
2000, there was widespread hope that this document represented a serious step toward 
meaningful reform of UN peacekeeping.  In 2003, the Henry L. Stimson Center released 
a report entitled, Future of Peace Operations that analyzed and scored the UN’s level of 
compliance and implementation with the Brahimi Report recommendations.  The 
Stimson Center’s grading of the UN’s success and/or failure with compliance varied from 
the highest score of five, indicating that the implementation exceeds the Brahimi Report’s 
recommendation, to the lowest score zero, indicating that the recommendation was 
unimplemented.  Their findings and subsequent breakdown of the UN’s specific 
successes or failures in complying with the Brahimi Report recommendations were the 
foundation of this analysis.   
 This study is thus an attempt to understand why the UN has enjoyed both success 
and failure in regards to the implementation of the Brahimi Report recommendations.  
More importantly in terms of the implications and broader applicability of this study, this 
report attempts to understand the United Nation’s previous experiences in peacekeeping 
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and peace enforcement operations in addition to analyzing the UN’s progress with 
reforms geared towards these kinds of complex interventions as explored within the 
context of organizational theory.  The United Nations is, after all, an organization, and 
therefore should be studied as such.  This study thus uses a theoretical framework by 
Allison and Zelikow to understand the obstacles the United Nations has faced and will 
continue to face in regards to combat-heavy military interventions and attempts towards 
reform simply due to the organizational structure of the UN.  The findings were as 
followed: 
The UN intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s is a perfect example 
highlighting the UN’s inability, as an organization, to handle the complex militaristic and 
logistical demands of a complex combat-heavy operation, deployed under a Chapter VII 
mandate of the UN Charter.  By providing a unique example of an intervention that 
steadily progressed from a strictly humanitarian peace operation (UNOSOM I), to a hard 
military intervention under a chapter VII mandate (UNITAF) and (UNOSOM II), 
Somalia as a case study, is an important lesson on the range of success and failure that an 
international intervention can experience when attempting to undertake international 
conflict management.  The failure of UNOSOM I to adequately protect humanitarian 
relief supplies, and the ultimate failure of UNOSOM II to achieve its mandate which was 
to secure and essentially rebuild Somalia from the ground up, demonstrated that the 
foundational structure of the United Nations, in particular the UN’s management of 
military activities and actions as well as its military capabilities, are simply not designed 
to support the complex military operations that peacemaking operations require.   
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In particular, the UN intervention in Somalia is a concrete example highlighting 
specific instances in which the organizational failings of the United Nations negatively 
impacted the degree of success of the three intervention phases (UNOSOM I, UNITAF, 
and UNOSOM II).  When contrasting the differences between UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II 
and the US-led coalition task force UNITAF, the organizational failings of the United 
Nations significantly impacted three fundamental components that affect an operation’s 
chance of success: the mandate, the force structure, and the command and control of an 
intervention.  The story of the UN operations in Somalia thus helps to demonstrate the 
importance and relevance of this thesis, which is to understand 1) how the UN is failing 
organizationally in regards to peace intervention activities, 2) what attempts have been 
made to understand and fix these failings (i.e. the Brahimi Report), and 3) why the UN 
has been unable to comply with certain aspects of the recommended reforms thus far.   
 The organizational theories of Allison and Zelikow are particularly relevant to the 
study of the United Nations as an organization, providing a good framework to study how 
organizations in general are able to adapt to changing conditions and operational 
demands.  Given particular focus in this study are five specific hypotheses, that when 
applied to the study of the United Nations, help to explain its behavior in regards to the 
Brahimi Report.  
First, when organizational bodies experience failures to perform in the capacity 
for which they were originally created, these failures radically affect the learning curve of 
the organization and its subsequent ability and desire to change.  Thus the current 
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attempts towards reform within the United Nations can be explained by the dramatic 
performance failures that UN peacekeeping missions experienced in the 1990s.   
Second, the original principles upon which an organization was created and the 
consequential manner in which it was organized, are extremely influential upon the 
ability of an organization to adapt to shifting conditions.  The United Nations Charter did 
not explicitly describe how peace interventions should be designed, and thus with the 
expansion of 2nd generation peacekeeping following the end of the Cold War, the 
ambitious goals of the UN were not matched with a set design or specific strategy for 
these increasingly ambitious interventions, thus setting the stage for the string of failed 
interventions in the 1990s. 
Third and particularly relevant to this analysis is Allison and Zelikow’s discussion 
of the potential for “dangerous dysfunctionality,” referring to the damaging results that 
occur when an organization attempts to superimpose new, unfamiliar tasks onto old, 
previously established routines.1  When taken in the context of the large-scale 
humanitarian and peacebuilding operations that took place in Somalia and Bosnia, in 
which the foundational tenants of traditional peacekeeping were adapted in order to allow 
for UN interventions in increasingly complicated conflicts in which consent and/or 
impartiality of the intervening troops were not present, the consequences of this 
“dangerous dysfunctionality” resulted in the magnification of the consequences of small 
failures, a result which Allison and Zelikow argue, is inevitable.  
                                                
1 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 158. 
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Fourth, an organization’s reliance on standard operating procedures necessarily 
inhibits an organization’s ability to change.  In this sense, while standard operating 
procedures are useful in their ability to streamline the every day operations within an 
organization, as Allison and Zelikow state, “this regularized capacity for adequate 
performance is purchased at the price of standardization [….] Specific instances, 
particularly critical instances that typically do not have ‘standard’ characteristics, are 
often handled sluggishly or inappropriately.”2  The UN’s particular reliance and 
dependency on standard operation procedures also helps to explain why the United 
Nations is having difficulty implementing certain Brahimi Report recommendations, 
particularly those recommendations that entail broad, sweeping changes.  As Allison and 
Zelikow state, “the deeper the grounding, the more resistant SOPs are to change.”3  
Fifth, and most relevant in terms of the United Nations’ failure to successfully 
implement specific recommendations as made in the Brahimi Report, is an organization’s 
inability to engage in “directed change.”4  This limited flexibility in regards to an 
organization’s ability to change is due to the fact that: a) organizational budgets change 
incrementally; b) organizational culture, priorities, and perceptions are relatively stable; 
c) organizational procedures and repertoires change incrementally; d) New activities 
typically consist of marginal adaptations of existing programs and activities; and e) a 
program, once undertaken, is not dropped at the point where objective costs outweigh 
benefits.5  This does not mean that an organization is forever unable to change, however 
                                                
2 Ibid., 178. 
3 Ibid., 170. 
4 Ibid., 180. 
5 Ibid. 
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it does indicate that attempts at reform must be carefully targeted towards specific factors 
that support particular routines in order to effect major changes over time.6   
Thus, the ability or inability of the UN to implement particular Brahimi Report 
recommendations was greatly influenced by the types of reform advocated by the 
Brahimi Report Panel. Certain “easy to implement” recommendations contained key 
words such as “encourage” and “endorse.”  These recommendations received high 
implementation grades due to the fact that little action was needed to fulfill the 
recommendation’s requirement, and instead a particular department was simply required 
to support or encourage a particular course of action.   
Incremental organizational changes, for example technological changes requiring 
more money or technology, were easier to implement than whole scale organizational 
changes, which were much more difficult.  This directly fit Allison and Zelikow’s 
observations that organizational procedures and repertoires change incrementally, helping 
to explain why recommendations that focused on whole scale organizational changes, 
targeting major factors that support routines, such as personnel changes, rewards, 
information, or budgetary requirements, were much more difficult to implement 
The number of subdivisions and departments involved in the reform were also 
influential factors in the success of implementation.  As Allison and Zelikow point out, 
the organizational culture, priorities, and perceptions of an organization are relatively 
stable.  Thus the greater the number of subdivisions involved in the reform, the less likely 
that the reform was to have been successfully implemented due to the fact that the 
                                                
6 Ibid., 181-2. 
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culture, priorities, and perceptions of each targeted subdivision were required to adapt to 
the reform in order for the implementation to be successful; the fewer subdivisions 
involved, the easier.   
Recommendations that designated primary responsibility for the particular reform 
to Member States often received low to intermediary implementation scores.  As Allison  
and Zelikow point out, new activities typically consist of marginal adaptations of existing 
programs and activities.  Thus the low implementation scores were due largely to the fact 
that the ability of Member States to develop new activities were heavily impacted by their 
varying capabilities and willingness to build upon the uneven levels of organization that 
each particular member state has in its capacity.   
Recommendations that directly involved funding changes were less likely to be 
implemented due to the underlying fact that organizational budgets in general tend to 
change incrementally, as Allison and Zelikow state, “both with respect to totals and with 
respect to intra-organizational splits.”7   
Finally, in terms of the exception clause, there were several cases in which the 
recommendation was considered so important, that despite the difficulties involved 
(regarding the type of organizational change involved, the number of involved 
subdivisions, member state implementation, or funding) the addressed issue was 
reformed.   
The findings of this study can thus be applied to future attempts towards reform, 
not only within the UN’s realm of peace operations, but also in regards to more general 
                                                
7 Ibid., 180. 
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reforms that apply to the organization as a whole.  As discussed in chapter six, the UN is 
capable of change as demonstrated by its ability to comply with certain Brahimi Report 
recommendations.  The United Nations, however, is resistant to change, due to the 
structure of the organization.  This does not mean, however, that is fundamentally unable 
to do so.  Attempts at reform must be able to circumvent these obstacles through targeted, 
direct action that aim to reform one organization within the United Nations at a time 
rather than to change the inter-organizational relationships within which the subdivisions 
of the UN are embedded.8 For if the United Nations ever hopes to be able to reassert itself 
as a credible, capable, intervening force within the international arena, the organization 
and its member-states must be able to prove to each other, as well as themselves, that the 
organization is not only capable of complying with the recommendations as provided by 
the Brahimi Report, but is also willing to do so.    
                                                
8 Dijkzeul, Reforming For Results in the UN System, 219. 
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